February 27, 2007

NRC extends comment period for security rule until March 26, 2007

On October 26, 2006 (71 FR 62664), NRC published proposed rule on security at nuclear plants and Category I strategic nuclear materials facilities. A planned public meeting to help public make informed comments, scheduled for earlier this month, was postponed due to inclement weather. That meeting has been rescheduled for March 9. The State of New York formally requested that comment period be extended, as did the NGO Riverkeepers. NRC chose the 30-day extension period in part because, according to NRC's Annette L. Vietti-Cook, "security requirements impact new reactor applications, and it is NRC's objective to not adversely impact new reactor applications which the NRC expects to be submitted in late 2007." Ms. Vietti-Cook's letter to New York Assistant Attorney General, dated February 22, and copy of Federal Register notice about the extension, are available as ADAMS ACN ML070520022.

February 22, 2007

ACRS to discuss safeguards and security strategies for new reactor designs

On March 9, 2007, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) is scheduled to hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff regarding the research on mitigating strategies for new reactor designs. This session will be closed to public, to protect information classified as National Security information as well as safeguards information pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(1) and (3).

[Source: Meeting Notice for Federal Register, 540th Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards -- ML070400481]

November 27, 2006

Strangers at Braidwood gates

Twice last month, motorists were charged with drunken driving after pulling up to the security guardhouse -- by mistake -- at the nuclear-power plant in Braidwood, Ill. Lloyd Kuykendall, 38, handed a guard $1, thinking he had approached a tollbooth, according to police; and 10 days later, Stanislaw Drobrzawski, 51, tried to align his car with the guardhouse, seeing it as a gas-station pump.

[Source: Chuck Shepherd (Universal Press Syndicate), "NEWS OF THE WEIRD", The Columbus Dispatch, November 27, 2006, p. D8]

March 22, 2006

Harris - security probe expanded from cheating to retaliation

NRC is expanding it's probe into allegations that security guards at Shearon Harris plant cheated on qualification tests. Allegations that security guards faced retaliation for reporting injuries or for raising security concerns have yet to be fully evaluated by NRC staffers. In January, NRC interviewed 91 security guards and reviewed company documents about concerns raised the previous month by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the North Carolina Waste Awareness and Reduction Network. The groups raised 19 different issues they said were reported to them by security guards at the nuclear plant after their complaints to the NRC were ignored. "Concerns raised about cheating and intimidation trouble me personally and the NRC is continuing its review of these issues," Progress Energy chairman and chief executive Bob McGehee said. "We do not tolerate this kind of behavior in our workplace." McGehee said the company is retesting every security guard at the nuclear plant to ensure they are qualified. "We will take all the appropriate action necessary based on further information we receive from the NRC," he said.

[Source: The Associated Press State & Local Wire, NRC team to pobe security concerns at N.C. nuclear plant, The Associated Press State & Local Wire, March 23, 2006 4:01 am GMT

* [2006-03-22] Kansas to let nuclear plant guards "shoot to kill"
Reuters

* [2006-03-01] Fly a jet into our N-plant, it WON'T hurt it
Mark Hookham, icNorthWales

February 16, 2006

N-plant security - Kansas legislature is considering tougher penalties for tresspassers and giving guards more authority to use lethal force

Security officers guarding the Wolf Creek nuclear plant would have a license to kill if terrorists attacked under a bill receiving tentative approval Wednesday in the House. The bill also creates a new felony of trespassing on a nuclear generating facility with a prison sentence of up to 36 months. The bill, HB 2703, needs a final vote of approval to send it to the Senate. It gives guards protecting the nuclear plant legal protection for using physical or deadly force to stop those attempting to enter the state's only commercial nuclear facility and cause harm. The owner of the plant also would be protected from civil liability, provided the guards are properly trained and reasonably believe there is a clear and present threat. Legislators said they didn't want a situation where terrorists could launch an attack and then turn around and file a lawsuit against Wolf Creek's operators and guards for defending the plant. Liability for guards at other potential targets, such as chemical plants, feedlots or critical infrastructure, is not addressed by the bill.

Supporters cited the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the threat of future attacks as the need for the legislation. "After 9-11, our soil is a battle ground," said Rep. Mario Goico, R-Wichita and chairman of the Select Committee on Kansas Security. Goico said the bill would give the Wolf Creek guards the same authority as military personnel if they were called out to defend the perimeter of the nuclear plant during time of heightened alert. The guards would have the authority to detain intruders or shoot to kill them if they had reasonable belief that there was a threat to the plant or its personnel.

Democrats said the bill went too far in giving the plant's operators too much immunity from liability, saying they should be held accountable for properly screening, hiring and training their guards. "The term justified is not a term of art in the legal world," said Rep. Paul Davis, D-Lawrence. Guards would be held harmless only in circumstances spelled out in the law, said Rep. Carl Krehbiel, R-Moundridge, and failure to provide proper training would be grounds for civil action.

[Source: John Milburn (AP writer), "Bill advanced by House would eliminate liability for Wolf Creek guards", The Associated Press State & Local Wire, February 16, 2006 1:20 am GMT]

November 20, 2005

N-plant vulnerability to terror attack - compared to fossil fuel supply fragility due to wars and hurricanes?

... while nuclear power plants could be vulnerable to a terrorist attack, war and recent hurricanes have underscored the fragility of fossil-fuel supplies.

[Source: Tim Gray (New York Times, Money and Business/Financial Desk), "Can Nuclear Power Become Just Another Business?", The New York Times, November 20, 2005, p. 3-5

nuclear.COMment: Gee whiz, surely the New York Times knows that the prospects of loss of electrical generating capacity is not the effect that makes folks worried about terror attacks on nuclear plants.

June 2, 2005

* Rally pleases local officials
Michael Goot, Foster's Daily Democrat (NH)

Portsmouth Mayor Evelyn Sirrell said she hopes President Bush will ultimately be convinced that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard does not belong the base closing list because of its vital need in homeland security. "What is he thinking? We have a nuclear power plant in Seabrook and what's going to happen if terrorists come here. They've got no security in this area whatsoever," she said. "I just don't feel safe now. Any of those terrorists could come in and do a job on us," she said. If the shipyard is not there, the Coast Guard cutters will not have a berth. Sirrell said she hoped more people will be sending letters to her in support of the shipyard.

June 1, 2005

* Congressmen claim more Seabrook security problems
The Associated Press/Worcester Telegram (MA)

Reps. Edward Markey and John Tierney said Wednesday in a second letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the agency "take immediate action to protect public safety" at Seabrook. They said additional safety issues were raised by a Seabrook employee regarding defective security cameras and the plant's failure to conduct a security analysis. "Last week I learned that the security fence at Seabrook has been broken for months," Markey said. "Now it turns out that this is just the tip of the iceberg. The fence is broken, the security cameras don't work, and some required security analysis hasn't even been performed. It seems the plant motto is 'see no evil, hear no evil, maybe no evil exists.'"

May 29, 2005

* Public has right to know about failded Seabrook Station fence
Portsmouth Herald Sunday (NH) editorial

The idea that the security fence surrounding the Seabrook Station nuclear power plant has not been operating since it was installed late last year is frightening enough. But what is more frightening - and perhaps even more dangerous - is the ability of plant personnel and owners to hide behind the laws enacted since Sept. 11, 2001, in order to keep their failures quiet. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission used to put incident reports on its Web site. It was a way for the public to know just how safe their local power plants are. However, in the paranoia that has gripped this country since 9/11/01, this - as well as other types of information formerly accessible to the public - is no longer available.

The fact is neither we, nor you the reader, would have known about the nuclear plantÕs failure to adequately install or test one of the primary safeguards against a terrorist attack had it not been for the willingness of someone inside the plant, who was fed up with how security was being mismanaged, to come forward. This employee took a risk. It showed courage and more concern for the community surrounding the nuclear plant than was evident from the plantÕs management, which failed to do the things necessary to find out if this perimeter intrusion fence was working properly. It makes one wonder just what else is going wrong inside our nuclear plants, chemical-production facilities, ports and airports that we citizens will never be able to find out about - and, therefore, never be able to exert the pressure necessary to change them - because that information is deemed too sensitive to be released.

In fact, when we asked a Seabrook Station official to confirm the fence failure, he said he could not because he would be in violation of federal law. He also warned that sharing this important information with our readers could bring federal fines and punishments. We decided to write the story because we believe our readers, almost all of whom live within the 10-mile evacuation zone surrounding Seabrook Station, need to know the failure of a primary security system had gone undetected for nearly eight months. We also factored in information from Seabrook officials that they had immediately embarked on correcting the problem and there are sufficient redundant systems in place to keep the plant and the public safe.

But we were told at least one other news organization had information about the fence failure and decided not to release it to the public. We can only assume it was because of the threat of federal reprisals. There is certainly a concern that reporting on security failures at potential terrorist targets could make that information known to those willing to take advantage of those soft spots in order to wreak havoc on our country and our citizens. However, in many cases the option is to simply take the word of those with vested interests in portraying an aura of security when none actually exists, as the Seabrook Station event shows.

One of the roles of the media is to be the watchdog that barks at night, and tells everyone in the house something is wrong - especially if the back gate is open. Increasingly, there is a desire of policymakers, especially the current majority party in power, to muzzle the dog. Federal policymakers would like less public oversight, but more knowledge of your most intimate details. A free press is a vital part of our system of checks and balances, and was very much envisioned by our founding fathers. The Seabrook Station incident shows how these issues play out right here in our back yard. We are best as a community, and as a nation, when we allow openness and public scrutiny of homeland security, when we insist on transparency as to what our government "of the people" has done lately - or has not done - to protect us.

May 27, 2005

* Reps: Seabrook security fence useless
Susan Morse, The Exeter News-Letter

Sandra Gavutis, executive director of nuclear watchdog group C-10 in Newburyport, said the organization has heard about "a lot of burnout and discontent among the guards" from whistleblowers. She said the public is given little information from the plant, particularly since the events of Sept. 11, 2001. "Since 9/11, when information like this comes to the public, it just makes us that more skeptical," she said. "ItÕs a breach in the trust of the plant. They keep saying, Ôbe assured, weÕre as concerned about safety as you are.Õ This didnÕt come from the plant, it came from a whistleblower. "ItÕs a real lapse of security, there should be real concerns," said Gavutis, "the installer, the NRC, the utility have fallen short in protecting our safety." Gavutis said whistleblowers who come to C-10 are referred to either Markey or Tierney.

Seabrook Station unveiled $14 million in security upgrades, including the intruder-detection system, last fall. The upgrades were mandated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2003, with a completion date of this Oct. 29. The NRC required enhancements to the physical structure, training and employee qualifications and a contingency plan, leaving the implementation up to the individual plants.

Seabrook town officials expressed no real alarm at the alleged lack of security at the plant. "It really didnÕt cause me any concern," said Fire Chief Jeff Brown. "I expect theyÕre professionals at what they do." "I just feel the agencies responsible will take care of this," said Selectwoman Cora Stockbridge. "I have faith they will take care of it." Town Manager Fred Welch said on Wednesday he had not been in contact with plant officials concerning the alleged security breach.

* Inoperable detection system
The Hampton Union (NH) editorial

There's some scary things in the document discussing security fence at Seabrook. The public relations spokesman for the Seabrook nuclear power plant makes it abundantly clear that the people who run the operation think that security was never compromised, but itÕs hard not to be more than a little concerned that the "perimeter intrusion detection system" has probably not been working since it was installed more than six months ago. This is a major embarrassment for the plant and its security. The plant didnÕt want this information before the public. It was leaked. And we, for one, are glad it was. This was a serious deficiency in plant security that was mandated after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. We are thankful the NRC discovered the problem and that measures have been taken as a result. We want to believe Griffith when he says weÕre safe and not to worry. But we would rather know that something went wrong and is being fixed than to have had the information hidden from us. And we would feel better about the situation had it been the plant or the NRC that had made the matter public.

Translation of some of the scary things in the document: The thing didnÕt work. It would never have worked. Somebody or some people at the plant screwed up. They really dropped the ball on this one. The plantÕs security agency and managers were not doing a good enough job, at least where the detection system was concerned.

May 26, 2005

* Can nuclear plant deal with attack?
Greg C. Bruno, Times Herald-Record (Middletown, NY)

Indian Point has buoys in the Hudson River marking the perimeter of a 900-foot "seclusion zone". This article describes the reporter's trip, aboard a 36-foot boat operated by Riverkeeper group, to within about 2,000 feet of the plant -- a distance "well within missile range ... of a number of black market weapons systems". Meanwhile, the plant's two patrol boats stayed tied to the plant's bulkhead. "It strikes me that it would be incredibly easy to get around the security forces that are in place," the pilot said as he turned his vessel from the facility. "What they're doing is like a police helicopter flying around the World Trade Center trying to protect them, he said. "It's not going to work." With a rocket propelled grenade, someone would have to be "closer than a few hundred yards" to the plant, says Jim O'Halloran, the London-based editor of Land Based Air Defense. "But if you're talking anti-tank weapons, bunker busters, you can use anything up to about a nautical mile," or about 6,000 feet, he says. "In that case, yes, there are anti-tank weapons that would do the job with penetrating warheads."

May 25, 2005

* Seabrook Station officials say plant remains secure
Jerry Miller, The Union Leader (Manchester NH)

The Perimeter Intrusion Detection System is a portion of the security fence. PIDS is one of three elements of Seabrook Station's security operation. The others are a variety of physical barriers, which limit entrance options, and an armed security force. The PIDS problem was detected around May 5 during routine testing of the system during an inspection by Region 1 of the NRC.

"At no time would we leave any vulnerability unaddressed," Seabrook spokesperson Alan Griffith insisted. "We have multiple layers of security. . . . We have many ways of doing the same thing. At no point have we ever lost our ability to protect the public's health and safety." Griffith said at no time have unauthorized persons ever penetrated the plant due to the PIDS problem.

* Congressmen Claim Homeland Security Lapse At Seabrook
Associated Press/WMUR-TV, Channel 9 (Manchester NH)

Reps. Edward Markey and John Tierney wrote letter to NRC asking numerous questions about claims that an intruder detection system at Seabrook wasn't installed correctly and did not work, and that the plant forced security guards to work overtime to compensate. "If these allegations are true, they represent a significant homeland security lapse at the Seabrook nuclear power plant, which the licensee appears to be compensating for by creating an overworked, overtired and consequently less effective security guard force," Markey and Tierney wrote in a letter to NRC Chairman Nils Diaz.

Plant spokesman Alan Griffith said federal law prohibits him from discussing safety issues, but he said that "at no time has Seabrook ever been in a position that it can't protect public health and safety." He added that the plant's safety systems "are multilayered and not isolated to any one system." And he called the overtime allegation "completely erroneous. We have no idea where Markey is getting this."

A Seabrook employee brought the allegations to the attention of Markey's office, the letter says. Markey's office was told the detection system was installed at the plant last year, but that on a recent inspection the NRC concluded it had been installed incorrectly, didn't work and probably needed to be replaced. "In the meantime, Seabrook officials are reportedly using reactor security guard forces to compensate for the inoperable security system, and have violated NRC regulations by forcing these security guards to work excessive amounts of overtime," the letter says. Markey and Tierney asked Diaz whether the inspection occurred and if the NRC would investigate the alleged overtime violations, among other questions.

May 24, 2005

* Nuke plant fence was 'inoperable'
Shir Haberman, Portsmouth Herald (NH)

A security fence intended to prevent outside threats to Seabrook Station failed a recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection and was declared inoperable, according to an internal plant document obtained by the Portsmouth Herald. "Security initiated (a) report that on May 5, several Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) zones failed challenge testing during a regional NRC inspection and were declared inoperable," the internal document indicated. "Compensatory measures were implemented immediately following the determination that the zones were inoperable." The fence was installed by a subcontracted engineering firm on Oct. 29, 2004. The requirement to upgrade Seabrook StationÕs fence came from NRC mandates stemming from the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.

In response to the failure of the security component, Seabrook Station launched an investigation. Officials identified two basic causes of the failure, according to the internal documents. The first was the "the Perimeter Intrusion Detection System design was inadequate," and the second was that "the system testing performed to commission the system, and subsequent tests to ensure operability, were deficient, which resulted in failure to identify the inadequate design," the documents indicated. Both design of the system and testing procedures did not adhere to NRC guidelines, the internal report said. The report also found two other factors that contributed to the systemÕs failure. The first was that Seabrook StationÕs primary owner, Florida Power, Light and EnergyÕs, review and approval of the system vendor, Proto-Power, "lacked vigor." In fact, the report states that, when FPLEÕs design engineer was questioned about the failure, he stated that "neither the vendor manual nor (NRC regulations) were utilized." The other contributing factor was that the nuclear plant suffered from "inadequate security organizational effectiveness," the report indicated. There was "inadequate monitoring of system performance," "no evidence of management oversight of system testing," and "security human performance observations are performed almost exclusively by Wackenhut personnel and are not self-critical." Wackenhut is the security company hired by Seabrook Station to protect the plant.

Alan Griffith, spokesperson for the power plant, said Monday that federal law prevented him from commenting on specific security issues, but said plant security was never threatened. "At no time have we lost our ability to protect public health and safety," he said. Griffith would only say a component of the security system "was not operating the way we wanted it to" during a routine test. He would not say what that component was or when it was tested. "During these routine tests ... you can have a result youÕre not thrilled about, but itÕs not the end of the world," Griffith said. Whenever an issue with a system component comes up, it is immediately addressed by plant staff, Griffith added. "The bottom line is Seabrook Station is safe; it is secure," he said.

April 16, 2005

* Browns Ferry guards accept agreement
Samira Jafari, AP/The Decatur Daily (Decatur, Alabama)

In 1998, TVA went from employing its own security officers to hiring a private security contractor. Eric McMillen, president of Local 22 of the United Government Security Workers of America, said the switch cut average hourly pay by about $4 to $12.85. A contract agreement with Pinkerton Government Services was accepted Friday by Browns Ferry security officers, by vote of 99-4. The contract increases pay of the 130 Pinkerton officers at Browns Ferry by 25 percent to 30 percent, improves family health care coverage and adds one more paid holiday for guards at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. "It's considerably more than what we anticipated," said McMillen, adding "I'm elated ... We got everything in our contract we asked for." TVA, the nation's largest public utility, stayed out of the contract talks. Browns Ferry spokesman Craig Beasley said, "TVA continues to expect Pinkerton to provide the security force that we need. We feel the nuclear plants are the most secure in the country and we're going to keep them that way."

* US panel: Fuel pool attack could trigger zirconium fire
Thecla Fabian, Nuclear Engineering

A terrorist attack on the spent fuel pools at some US nuclear plants could trigger a high-temperature zirconium fire that would lead to a significant release of radioactivity, though not on the scale of the 1986 Chernobyl explosion, concluded a blue-ribbon panel of scientists assembled by the National Research Council of the US National Academies. The unclassified academies' report, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: Public Report, contains all the findings and recommendations of the classified report, but with all national security and safeguards information removed, said Louis Lanzerotti, who chaired the 15-member expert panel pulled together by the academies' Board on Radioactive Waste Management in response to a mandate from congress. The panel spent six months gathering and analyzing data, and meeting with regulators, nuclear industry experts, and independent scientists. Lanzerotti is a geophysics expert consulting for Bell Laboratories and Lucent Technologies and a distinguished professor for solar-terrestrial research at the New Jersey Institute of Technology. Other panel members included a former NRC division director in nuclear materials management, and experts in the behaviour of nuclear materials at high temperatures, penetration mechanics, ballistics and weapons technology, health physics, actinide chemistry, heat transfer, thermal hydraulics, structural engineering and terrorism. The panel unanimously concluded that an attack that caused either partial or complete draining of a plant's spent fuel pool might be capable of starting a high-temperature fuel cladding fire that could lead to the Òrelease of large quantities of radioactive material into the environment.Ó The risk depends on a number of factors, including the type of attack, the design of the fuel pool, and the configuration of the fuel in the pool. The panel recommended two immediate measures that could reduce the potential for fuel cladding fires: (1) The reconfiguration of the position of fuel assemblies in the pools to more evenly distribute decay heat loads; and (2) Making provisions to cool the fuel with water spray systems that could continue to operate even after a pool or the building housing it is damaged. The panel noted that water spray systems might not be needed at plants where the fuel pools are located below ground or otherwise protected.

... Pools are and will continue to be needed at all nuclear plants for the foreseeable future, the panel stressed, noting that fuel newly removed from the reactor needs about five years cooling time in a water pool before it can be loaded into casks. For older fuel, however, dry storage has two advantages. It is a passive system that relies on air circulation for cooling, and it divides the spent fuel inventory into a number of individual, robust containers that contain only a small amount of the total inventory. Different dry cask systems available on the US market differed only slightly in robustness under different terrorist attack scenarios, the panel found.

* Spent-fuel storage 'secure'; What is Dominion power doing to protect tons of highly radioactive spent fuel at North Anna nuclear plant?
Rusty Dennen, Free Lance-Star (Fredericksburg, VA)

More than 900 tons of highly radioactive spent fuel sits in a swimming-pool-like enclosure and in 22 giant steel casks at North Anna Power Station. Every 18 months, North Anna's two reactors must be shut down and partially refueled. Sixty-four spent fuel assemblies are typically removed from each reactor core. Each reactor has 157 assemblies. The assemblies -- rectangular modules packed with uranium-pellet-filled tubes -- are lifted from the reactor and submerged in what looks like an industrial-size indoor swimming pool. Twenty-seven feet of water, infused with neutron-absorbing boron, protects workers in the room from radiation. The pool sits between North Anna's two reactors. The spent fuel assemblies are submerged, where they will stay for at least five years to cool. After that, they are placed in helium-filled steel casks, which are decontaminated and moved to the storage area outside. Helium is an inert gas that helps transfer heat to the outside of the casks, each of which holds 32 fuel assemblies. The gas is easy to detect if there's a container leak. Twenty-two of the 115-ton storage containers sit on concrete pads in a fenced, secure enclosure at North Anna. By 2010, there could be 36. It has become an issue locally because Dominion power -- owner of the North Anna plant -- has an application to add up to two more reactors wending its way through the regulatory process. More reactors would mean the storage of many more tons of spent fuel.

Earlier this month the National Academy of Sciences recommended a plant-by-plant review of the storage pools at nuclear plants, suggesting that they may be vulnerable to terrorist attack.

Environmental groups opposing additional reactors at North Anna say the protection of the spent fuel is a legitimate concern and that expansion would present a more tempting target to terrorists. In a public hearing in February in Louisa on environmental aspects of Dominion's early site-permit application, spent fuel was addressed by a number of speakers. One of them was Sue Chase, who lives in Albemarle County, about 50 miles from North Anna. "Who can assure us that a plant won't be bombed, invaded or hit by a plane and that the fuel rods won't be exposed, resulting in a devastating fire? No one." The [NAS] report [released earlier this month] said the spent-fuel pool, and others like it in 31 states, could be compromised by a suicide aircraft or high-explosive attack, exposing the assemblies and unleashing an uncontrollable fire and large amounts of radiation. The NRC has concluded release from such a fire would be "extremely low," but the agency still advised reactor operators to consider reconfiguring the fuel assemblies in the pools. Jerry Rosenthal, president of Concerned Citizens of Louisa and a member of the People's Alliance for Clean Energy, formed to oppose the North Anna expansion, scoffs at the notion [that the spent-fuel storage systems are safe and secure]. "They are protected very well from ground attack, or certain types of attack. Not from above. The pool is covered by a [thin steel] building and the casks are covered by nothing." "We have video of [military] TOW missiles blowing holes in the casks," he said, adding, "Seven attorneys general around the U.S. have recommended putting towers and wire barriers above dry casks and pools for further protection from air attack."

"These facilities are very secure," said Richard Zuercher, spokesman for Dominion's nuclear operations. He said the Nuclear Regulatory Commission "already did an assessment of individual [plant] sites and made recommendations for everybody to implement, and we are in full compliance with those orders." Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Zuercher said, security has been ramped up, and the chance of a terrorists attacking the fuel pool or the casks is remote. "A lot of money has been spent [on security] by Dominion since 9/11, but we believe the sites were very secure before 9/11." Zuercher says just how and where the security has been beefed up is a secret, for obvious reasons. But he said: "We have increased our security force. We have more officers and we have put more sophisticated surveillance equipment in that allows us to keep watch on all of the property." Zuercher said that prior to 9/11, security was focused on the secure area of the plant containing the reactors, spent-fuel pool and storage casks. "Since then, security has been enhanced to cover the whole [plant] site."

Dominion recently received permission from the Louisa County Board of Supervisors to add another cask-storage pad. New casks will be better protected -- encased in reinforced-concrete containers. The board didn't go along with a Planning Commission recommendation that a berm be added to the fenced area around the casks to improve security from a possible shoulder-fired-missile attack. Dominion, however, was asked to study a berm.

On Monday, the Government Accountability Office found that some utilities have not kept close enough track of spent fuel. The GAO report questioned oversight by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and said the materials "could be diverted or stolen and used maliciously." The report was requested last year by Vermont's two senators following news that spent fuel had been reported missing at the Vermont Yankee plant. It was later found in the spent-fuel pool, but not where records said it was supposed to be. Spent fuel also was reported missing from the Millstone nuclear plant in Connecticut in 2000 and from the Humboldt Bay plant in California last year.

Dominion power has accounted for all the spent fuel at its North Anna and Surry plants.

January 4, 2005

* UK - 1974 - govt covered up nuclear plant weaknesses re security, emegency preparedness

October 22, 2004

* Columbia Generating Station - overview of access control badge and biometric system

June 3, 2004

Vermont Yankee - overview of NRC's approach to physical security

A resident of Greenfield, Mass. expressed concerns, via letter to NRC, about Vermont Yankee, including the possibility of a terrorist attack. Here's excerpt from NRC official's reply letter:

NRC regulations set high standards for safety and security programs at nuclear power plants and other sensitive nuclear facilities. Since the NRC's inception, security has been an important part of the NRC's regulatory activities, with defense-in-depth as the guiding design and operating principle. NRC regulations ensure that nuclear power plants are among the most hardened and secure industrial facilities in our nation. The many layers of protection include robust plant design features, sophisticated surveillance equipment, physical security protective features, professional security forces, and access authorization requirements. Together, these layers of protection provide an effective deterrence against potential safety or security problems related to terrorist activities that could target equipment vital to nuclear safety. Although there have been no specific credible threats against the nation's nuclear power plants, following the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC has taken a number of steps to improve the already high level of security, including more training for security guards and requiring additional guards at the plants. The effectiveness of these security program improvements has been verified by the NRC.
Note: a PDF copy of NRC's May 27 letter is available from NRC at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html, by entering accession number ML041420135

March 29, 2004

* San Onofre - security officer wounded while holstering his weapon

March 26, 2004

N-plants - sitting ducks for terrorists; makes decentralized electric generation look good

... nuclear power facilities are sitting ducks for terrorists. This is a big negative for nuclear technology of any stripe, and is one of the factors driving the movement toward decentralized electricity generation.

[Source: Ole Hendrickson (citizen watchdog on nuclear issues, for decades), "Should we invest in nuclear power?", The Toronto Star,ÊMarch 26, 2004, p. A21]

March 13, 2004

* Security - consumes 40% of Commissioner Merrifield's time lately, up from 5% before 9-11

March 12, 2004

Pilgrim gets extended National Guard protection

If not for a supplemental budget bill signed into law in Massachusetts, the National Guard would have ceased protecting Pilgrim nuclear plant on March 8. Senator Therese Murray, D-Plymouth, chairs the Senate Committee on Ways & Means: "Safety and security at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant, the Mirant Plant in Sandwich and PAVE PAWS have always been a priority of mine," she said. "Given today's uncertain times, we should continue to be proactive in safeguarding these installations. I am pleased that my colleagues in the House and Senate and the Governor sought to support my efforts to keep the Guard stationed at Pilgrim." Murray has been active on other Pilgrim security fronts, too. She worked with the United States Coast Guard in restricting ocean access to Pilgrim, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to institute a no-fly zone over the plant, and pressed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to federalize security protecting Pilgrim. Murray also persuaded the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (DPH) to obtain Potassium Iodide from the NRC for all of the communities within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone and led efforts for legislation that provides the pills to all communities within a 50-mile radius of the plant.

[Source: Kingston Mariner (Massachusetts), "National Guard remains at nuclear plant", March 12, 2004]

CGS budget squeezed by new security mandates; 60 non-security jobs to be cut

The 60 jobs to be eliminated by June 30 at Columbia Generating Station represent about 5% of the company's workforce. About half of the job cuts will be through planned retirements, normal attrition and vacancies that will not be filled. The rest will be based on operational requirements, employee performance, versatility and length of service. The security force will not be affected. The cuts are part of the company's approach to cutting $5-million in costs during next fiscal year. More than $7-million in previously unanticipated security costs are now expected to be incurred in coming year due to new federal requirements.

[Source: Associated Press, "Energy Northwest to cut 60 jobs at Hanford nuclear plant", Seattle Times, March 12, 2004]

March 11, 2004

* Security fatigue - draft order for ISFSIs and decommissioned reactors (Feb 26 meeting summary)

February 18, 2004

* Seabrook - mail handler's reaction-like symptoms

December 11, 2003

* Ft Calhoun - vulnerability found in access control system for a safeguards area

September 17, 2003

'Part of nuclear security is not talking about it'

"Part of nuclear security is not talking about it," said Gene Gwiazdowski, director of security for a nuclear power plant in Calvert Cliffs, Md. Gwiazdowski said the less information that is available to the general public about security at the plants, the easier it is to protect the facilities.

Physical barriers such as steel cables, roadway blockades and several layers of fencing around nuclear power plants do the job, he said. But all of the preparation could be undermined if a plant worker provided classified information to terrorists.

He said guards at the 103 nuclear power plants in the United States undergo extensive background checks before being hired.

[Source: Crystal Bolner (Times-Picayune business writer), "TECHNOLOGY TAKES ON TERRORISM: Experts monitoring latest security devices at N.O. convention", The Times-Picayune (New Orleans), September 17, 2003]

September 11, 2003

Examples of security improvements at Arkansas Nuclear One

Phil Fisher (Arkansas Nuclear One), cited by Misty Hale, "Unity in 9/11 aftermath: Area emergency officials working together more than ever", The Courier (Russellville, Arkansas), September 11, 2003

... no threats have been directed specifically at nuclear plants since Sept. 11. General threats, however, have led to several upgrades in security at the plant.

One of these changes affects local fishermen. Boaters were previously allowed to fish near the intake and discharge canals on Lake Dardanelle, but those areas have since been cordoned off.

Plant officials have also set up permanent checkpoints at site boundaries, where they check people and vehicles coming on site. Surveillance on shorelines and boundaries is constant now, Fisher said. Background checks on current and new employees have been stepped up, and random searches are performed on employee vehicles.

A supply warehouse has been moved further away from both reactors, and everything inside is X-rayed or otherwise searched, Fisher said.

Additional concrete barriers have been added near the reactors as well. One of three entrances to the plant was closed, and a bus route through the plant was rechanneled.

The plant also stepped up security patrols, and officers spend more time at the firing range, Fisher said.

August 21, 2003

*Kewaunee - access granted to vital area despite lack of authorization

*Point Beach - access granted to vital area despite lack of authorization

July 26, 2003

* VC Summer - Security officers render control room chiller inoperative by propping open door to get some cool air at hot post

* VC Summer - NRC inspector surprised to see safeguards info come via insecure email

July 21, 2003

* Security - fatigue prevention considerations and initiatives (July 2003)

July 14, 2003

Crystal River contract security force talking strike

The contract security officers at Crystal River want more than their $14/hr. Their 3-year contract expires at midnight, although the parties have agreed to keep negotiating without threat of walkout through August, if necessary.

[Source: Times Staff Writer, "Guards try more talks to avoid plant strike", St. Petersburg Times, July 14, 2003]

July 2, 2003

* Sequoyah - missing weapon reported by Security

June 30, 2003

* St. Lucie - security guard accidentally fired gun during reloading

April 15, 2003

Davis-Besse - SPDS computer system penetrated by "Slammer" worm, disabled for almost 5 hours

Davis-Besse found several routes into its computer network which completely bypassed the security firewall. One of these routes allowed the slammer worm to take up residence in the plant's Safety Parameter Display System, used by operators to monitor the status of various safety-related processes and conditions. As a result of the worm's programming, the SPDS was disabled, a condition that continued for almost five hours on January 25, 2003. The operators were able to monitor the normally-displayed parameters by using various gauges and other devices in the control room.

The event occurred in the midst of much industry activity to ensure network security. NEI formed a task force on cybersecurity last year, for example, which is expected to issue industry-wide recommendations soon.

The nuclear power plant industry is expected to become even more potentially vulnerable to network attack in coming years. At present, various plant systems can be monitored remotely, but not actually controlled over a network connection. The efficiency and safety gains possible from remote operation capability are quite attractive, and if a company assures itself that outsiders can be kept out, the prospects for remote operation will be as close to irresistable as can be.

A Davis-Besse report on the slammer worm incident released by NRC is available here.