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N-plant regulation FAQs
* Probability is expressed as a number between 0 and 1 (0 to 100 percent likelihood of the occurrence of an event). The notation 3 × 10-6 can be read 0.000003, which means that there are three chances in 1,000,000 that the associated result (for example, a fatal cancer) will occur in the period covered by the analysis.
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N-plant regulation news
March 15, 2008 * Vermont Yankee - state legislature and license renewal March 13, 2008 * Vermont Governor requests independent safety assessment for VYNPP March 7, 2008 December 20, 2006 * Overly conservative NRC regulation: Seismic calculations for piping system design June 28, 2006 * UK considers streamlined 3-1/2-to-4-year licensing process for new n-plants January 31, 2006 * DOE - Rocky Flats celebration shows example of unreasonable ethics requirement on federal employees January 10, 2006 NRC is captive agency, according to California activists Activists consider the commission a "captive agency" easily pushed around by those it regulates. "NRC wants to do whatever the industry wants," said one environmentalist... Environmentalists say they fear a potential effort by California lawmakers to order a study on the feasibility of re-licensing nuclear power plants may lead to attempts to build new nuclear energy facilities in the state... [Source: EnergyWashington Week, "Activists Fear California Nuclear Plant Re-Licensing Study Proposal", January 11, 2006] April 18, 2005 *
The Costs of Secrecy
... secrecy can be harmful, not only to democratic values but to national security as well, because it can impede the flow of information to those who need it. Recently the National Academy of Sciences, as part of a report on the security of spent fuel at nuclear plants, provided an example, noting that "security restrictions on sharing of information and analyses are hindering progress in addressing potential vulnerabilities."... The last chapter of the report details how tight controls on information are inhibiting security improvements. Representatives of the nuclear industry, the blue-ribbon panel noted, have been frustrated by a lack of information available from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has not been sharing data that could help with "early actions to address identified vulnerabilities." In two instances the report cites, restrictions on information prevented studies from being shared among analysts for different organizations examining related questions. The panel itself "was unable to examine several important issues" related to the security of spent fuel, in part "because it was unable to obtain needed information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission." Nuclear regulators are hardly unusual in hoarding information so closely that they undermine the very security they seek to enhance. This is, rather, a norm in government. A federal court in Washington recently ordered the CIA to disclose budget data from as far back as 1963; the agency has, generally speaking, successfully resisted releasing such absurdly remote historical data, and it fought over the 1963 figures even after it turned out to have already made the information public. It is hardly a surprise that a government that cannot distinguish such matters from real state secrets -- that is classifying more and more every year, and spending billions to do it -- also cannot figure out what information must be shielded from the companies on the front lines of nuclear security and what information should be given to them. Somehow, a more rational approach to secrecy must take hold. July, 2004 Overview of NRC's use of PRA In accordance with its policy statement on the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), during the last decade the NRC has been increasingly using PRA technology in "all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state of the art in PRA methods and data." Examples of risk informed initiatives are: undertaking risk-informed rulemaking activities such as risk-informing 10 CFR Part 50, generating a risk-informed framework for supporting licensee requests for changes to a plant's licensing basis (Regulatory Guide 1.174), risk-informing the reactor oversight process, performing risk studies (e.g., for steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), and fire events), and evaluating the significance of events. In addition, the NRC is using PRA in the development of an infrastructure to license new reactors. Given the increasing importance of the role of PRA in regulatory decision making, it is crucial that decision makers have confidence in the results produced by PRAs. To support this, the NRC has issued Regulatory Guide 1.200 which describes an acceptable approach for determining the technical adequacy of PRA results for risk informed activity. Regulatory Guide 1.200 reflects and endorses guidance provided by standards produced by societies and industry organizations. It currently addresses the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications which was developed for a full power, internal events (excluding fire) Level 1 PRA and a limited Level 2 PRA, and Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI's) Probabilistic Risk Assessment Peer Review Process Guidance (NEI-00-02). [Source: A. Kolaczkowski (Science Applications International Corporation) et al., "Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)", Draft Report for Comment, NUREG-1792, July 2004, p. 1 -- ML041980358] June 3, 2004 Petition to NRC: issue confirmatory orders for all regulatory commitments by power reactors Greenpeace, NIRS and UCS have petitioned NRC, requesting that confirmatory orders be issued for all regulatory commitments made since 2000 by the management of US nuclear plants. Before deciding whether or not to accept the petition for formal review, an NRC Petition Review Board held a conference call with the petitioners, to let petitioners clarify or buttress the petition, and to let board members ask questions. Herb Berkow of NRC asked "Why do you specify confirmatory orders as opposed to some other mechanism? 20 Dave Lochbaum of UCS answered: "I guess we went by the precedent -- we found those two other recent examples where the NRC had issued confirmatory orders related to commitments. So, we felt that seemed to be the process that the NRC and the industry had adopted. So, we just went with the flow." Mr. Lochbaum expressed hope that NRC would also clarify whether a 10 CFR 54 requirement (regarding written commitments by licensees) applies to operating reactors, after a license is renewed, or only during renewal period. Mr. Lochbaum noted that it's not clear what criteria the NRC uses to issue confirmatory orders to back up certain commitments. "It doesnŐt seem to be based on the risk significance of the commitment or the risk significance of the commitment if itŐs not done", he said, adding "[i]t would be nice if the NRC could clarify that point down the road."
March 29, 2004 NRC inspection approach to n-plants was strengthened in April 2000 David Lockbaum, an engineer at the Union of Concerned Scientists, agrees that the NRC has become much tougher, even before 9/11 raised the specter of terrorists flying a jet into a nuclear power plant. Instead of inspecting nuclear plants every two years for four safety categories, the NRC since April 2000 has been looking them over every three months for 26 or so safety factors. "When performance starts to fall, it should show up sooner," says Mr. Lockbaum, a longtime campaigner for reducing the risks of nuclear power. [Source: David R. Francis, "After nuclear's meltdown, a cautious revival", The Christian Science Monitor, March 29, 2004] March 13, 2004 * NRC tells staff to improve communications with licensees, public and Commissioners March 12, 2004 * NRC and industry - like Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum, sez BREDL * Davis-Besse faces minimum of 3-5 years of heightened scrutiny by NRC * Davis-Besse - two NRC inspectors on duty each shift until further notice * Davis-Besse - independent audits required for at least 5 years as condition for restart * Davis-Besse's close call 'should not have been possible', sez NRC Chairman Diaz * Nuclear industry 'requires constant vigilance', sez Davis-Besse owner * NRC Regulatory Info Conference draws 1,300+ attendees in DC this week September 9, 2003 Risk-informed 50.69 option no good if full scope PRA required, NMC tells NRC Nuclear Management Company (NMC) filed comments with USNRC about proposed 10 CFR 50.69 ("Risk-Informed Categorization And Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors"). The company notes that the Federal Register notice (68 FR 26511, May 16, 2003) raises the question of whether an NRC- reviewed full scope, all modes PRA should be a prerequisite for Implementation of this rule. "Such a requirement", the company told NRC, "Is neither technically necessary, nor feasible and would eliminate 10 CFR 50.69 as a viable option for NMC." NMC is the licensed operator of Duane Arnold, Kewaunee, Monticello, Palisades, Point Beach, and Prairie Island plants. Two other organizations' comments on the proposed rule were released to public by NRC today, and nuclear.com found their difference in characterizing the purpose of the proposed rule interesting. Tennessee Valley Authority emphasized safety -- "substantially enhancing the safety focus, coherence, and efficiency of current regulations governing nuclear power plant operations." The Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification (NUGEQ) emphasized "reduc[ing] unnecessary regulatory burden" and "relax[ing] or eliminat[ing] certain special treatment requirements". NUGEQ members operate some 90 nuclear plants in US and Canada. The comment letters are reproduced here on nuclear.com as pdf files: NMC, TVA, and NUGEQ. August 19, 2003 Sweden - criminal charges against Barsebaeck plant referred to prosecutor Sweden's Act on Nuclear Activities codifies a central tenet for reactor safety: "This is a basic principle, that you shut down if something's not right and you cannot immediately find out why", is how Judith Melin, Director General of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) described the requirement at a press conference today. SKI has concluded that Barsebaeck-2 management violated this requirement when it allowed the plant to continue operating after an unsuccessful January 3, 2003 attempt to correct an abnormal flow condition in feedwater system. The flow problem had been noticed months earlier. When the plant finally shut down on January 16, it was discovered that some components called thermal mixers, which had been replaced during summer outage, had broken and pieces had come loose. Christer Viktorsson, director of SKI's Reactor Safety Office, told the press conference that there was a risk of eventual fuel damage and safety margins were compromised. The regulators concluded that the continued operation in the face of uncertainty represents a clear violation of the law, at least for the post-January 3 period, and very possibly even during prior period. This is the first time that SKI has referred criminal charges related to reactor safety to a prosecutor. The regulators also have concluded that there's a safety culture problem at the plant, and will not allow Barsebaeck to restart until specified improvements are made. Barsebaeck management disagrees with the regulator's conclusions. Their position is that neither regulations nor laws were broken. Barsebaeck, which is visible from Copenhagen, has some pretty adamant opponents in Denmark. Criminal charges don't seem likely to make any Danes feel better about the nearby plant. The low INES scale rating of the feedwater flow event (INES 1) may temper reaction from Denmark. But not all. Here's how Copenhagen Mayor Jens Kramer Mikkelsen reacted to SKI's announcement: "We've said for years that it's complete stupidity to have a nuclear plant so close to a major city. The Swedes have always defended themselves by saying that Barsebaeck has such good safety", Mikkelsen told the Danish newspaper Politiken. "Now, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has to stand up and say to the Swedes: 'Keep your promise to everyone in the region and close Barsebaeck.'" His opinion was echoed in Danish tabloid B.T.: "It is difficult to accept that our sister nation has completely ignored Danish protests about Barsebaeck for many years... Shouldn't the Swedes take the opportunity to take Danish protests seriously and take steps to shut down the doleful plant?... The cocky attitude to nuclear power characterises Swedish society, which is hierarchical and politically correct to a degree that's almost painful." [Refs: Associated Press, "Swedish prosecutors asked to investigate alleged violation of safety standards at nuclear plant", August 19, 2003; BBC News, "European press review: Nuclear no", August 20, 2003; Radio Sweden (Stockholm), "Criminal investigation into Swedish nuclear power plant", August 20, 2003; and Ariane Sains (Stockholm), "SKI files legal case against Barsebaeck", Nucleonics Week, August 21, 2003, p. 1] July 29, 2003 July 14, 2003 June 25, 2003 June 14, 2003 * Safety culture - everybody wants it; but nobody can define it, much less measure it * Safety culture regs would allow NRC to remove "toxic leadership" at n-plants * Safety culture regs not needed - it's the manifestations that are the violations June 2, 2003 * Hungary - gov't regulators find fault with their own failure to analyze safety of Paks fuel cleaning May 16, 2003 * NRR budget has been squeezed by Davis-Besse followup, and license renewal is staff's first choice for cuts NRC too friendly to power reactor industry? Regulatory agencies have long been known to have a hard time resisting "capture" by those whom it regulates. There's some theorists who believe such influence is an inherent disadvantage of relying upon regulatory agencies. The NRC was created, in fact, to eliminate the dual roles of regulation and promotion that was required of the Atomic Energy Commission. The charge that NRC is a captured agency has been made recently by North Carolina activists: * "Federal regulators are dangerously controlled by the nuclear industry." [Source: Jim Warren (executive director, N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network), "Edwards' Bill Does Not Go Far Enough", [letter to editor] Greensboro News & Record, December 14, 2002, p. A12] * "Several dozen elected state officials and thousands of citizens have urged Progress Energy Corp. to stop transporting and stockpiling this high-level nuclear waste. Orange County obtained internationally recognized experts and attorneys to challenge this conduct, but the industry-friendly Nuclear Regulatory Commission wouldn't let the experts testify, so the stockpile-target gets bigger with every month's trainload of waste." [Source: Lewis Pitts (guest columnist, attorney, NC-WARN Advisory Board member), "Nuclear energy puts us at risk", Durham Herald-Sun, April 4, 2003, p. A13] The charge was also raised in article in current issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: "... a recent report by the NRC's inspector general ("OIG 2002 Survey of NRC's Safety Culture and Climate," December 11, 2002) found that commission staff believed "that NRC is becoming influenced by private industry and its power to regulate is diminishing." [source: Hirsch et al., "The NRC's Dirty Little Secret", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 59(3):44, May/Jun2003] |