|Refueling floor news|
|nuclear.com||Nuclear Power||Spent fuel||N-plant Ops news||nuclear.com's Garage Sale||Discuss the news||About nuclear.com|
Brought to you by
The contact dose of an exposed nuclear
reactor fuel bundle residing in a nuclear reactor for about two years, is of
the order of a million rems per second. [Source: Dr. Peter Law (nuclear engineer, former NRC Administrative Law Judge), "Severe Nuclear Accidents:
Now What?", April 2012, p. 6]
Refueling floor news
May 3, 2013
* [npp-spent fuel;BWR6;ESBWR] Spent fuel - did you know BWR6 and ESBWR designs have smaller pools in containment, in addition to SFP?, nuclear.com info nugget
Dec 27, 2012
Monticello - spent fuel pool-related license amendment request passes NRC initial acceptance review
The license request will revise Technical Specification (TS) 4.3.1, “Fuel Storage Criticality,” and TS 4.3.3, “Fuel Storage Capacity,” to reflect fuel storage system changes and a revised criticality safety analysis that addresses the legacy fuel types in addition to the new AREVA ATRIUMTM 10XM fuel design.
The acceptance letter notes that "NRC staff anticipates the need for additional technical information regarding the Boral surveillance program at MNGP. The staff’s expectations regarding surveillance programs for neutron absorbing materials in the spent fuel pool are described in NUREG-1801, “Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report, Revision 2, dated December 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103490041), Aging Management Programs, Section XI.M40, “Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials other than Boraflex.” The program described in the GALL Report meets the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 62, “prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling.” The staff suggests that it would be prudent to further discuss the NRC staff’s expectations for Boral surveillance early in its review process."
Source: Terry A. Beltz (Senior Project Manager, NRC/NRR Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Plant Licensing Branch III-1), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Acceptance Review re: License Amendment Request for Fuel Storage Changes (TAC No. ME9893)", email, Dec 11, 2012
Spent fuel pool instrumentation - NRC post-Fukushima update
On June 21, 2012, NRC staff held a public meeting to answer questions about the draft interim staff guidance (ISG) for compliance with Order EA-12-051 issued March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12054A679). The order was issued based, in part, on the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century report, issued July 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807).
The purpose of this meeting was to answer questions from stakeholders on NRC's draft ISG, JLD-ISG-12-03, Compliance with Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, issued on May 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12144A323) for public comment (77 FR 33780). The draft ISG endorses, with exceptions, a guidance document submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). NEI 12-02, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, "To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation," Revision B, was submitted on May 11, 2012, for staff endorsement (ADAMS Accession No. ML12165A414). In accordance with the order, a final ISG document will be issued by NRC by August 31, 2012, following resolution of stakeholder comments.
NRC provided a summary of the actions leading to the order and the background on development of the ISG. NRC also covered the main features of the NEI proposed guidance, NEI 12-02, Revision B. NRC discussed the endorsement of NEI 12-02, Revision B, and summarized the exceptions.
This was a Category 3 public meeting and stakeholders were invited to ask questions throughout the meeting. Formal comments were not accepted at this meeting, but the ways to submit formal comments were discussed and are included in the slides (slide 11). The slides are provided in Enclosure 2 and at ADAMS Accession No. ML12172A294.
All of the questions asked were from NEI staff, industry staff, or technical equipment business representatives. Some of the topics discussed were how to determine design criteria for instruments for beyond-design-basis external events, portable instrumentation, protection of channels against natural phenomena, types of quality assurance programs that could be used, display locations, the use of multiple displays, and how quickly the level information is to be accessible.
Source: Lisa M. Regner (NRC/NRR project manager, Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate), "SUMMARY OF JUNE 21, 2012, PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH ORDER EA-12-051, SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION, RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT", memo to branch chief Robert J. Pascarelli, July 13, 2012
December 28, 2011
* "Currently, there are no approved methodologies for determining SFP storage limits, [and] there is no history with such methodologies..."
That was in NRC project manager's summary of a recent meeting between NRC and the PWR Owners' Group. The context was that the Owners' Group wants to move fuel pool storage limits out of the plant tech specs and into some other document. The full text of the meeting summary is available at http://www.nuclear.com/archive/2011/12/28/20111228-002.html.
April 16, 2005
US panel: Fuel pool attack could trigger zirconium fire
A terrorist attack on the spent fuel pools at some US nuclear plants could trigger a high-temperature zirconium fire that would lead to a significant release of radioactivity, though not on the scale of the 1986 Chernobyl explosion, concluded a blue-ribbon panel of scientists assembled by the National Research Council of the US National Academies. The unclassified academies' report, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: Public Report, contains all the findings and recommendations of the classified report, but with all national security and safeguards information removed, said Louis Lanzerotti, who chaired the 15-member expert panel pulled together by the academies' Board on Radioactive Waste Management in response to a mandate from congress. The panel spent six months gathering and analyzing data, and meeting with regulators, nuclear industry experts, and independent scientists. Lanzerotti is a geophysics expert consulting for Bell Laboratories and Lucent Technologies and a distinguished professor for solar-terrestrial research at the New Jersey Institute of Technology. Other panel members included a former NRC division director in nuclear materials management, and experts in the behaviour of nuclear materials at high temperatures, penetration mechanics, ballistics and weapons technology, health physics, actinide chemistry, heat transfer, thermal hydraulics, structural engineering and terrorism. The panel unanimously concluded that an attack that caused either partial or complete draining of a plant's spent fuel pool might be capable of starting a high-temperature fuel cladding fire that could lead to the "release of large quantities of radioactive material into the environment." The risk depends on a number of factors, including the type of attack, the design of the fuel pool, and the configuration of the fuel in the pool. The panel recommended two immediate measures that could reduce the potential for fuel cladding fires: (1) The reconfiguration of the position of fuel assemblies in the pools to more evenly distribute decay heat loads; and (2) Making provisions to cool the fuel with water spray systems that could continue to operate even after a pool or the building housing it is damaged. The panel noted that water spray systems might not be needed at plants where the fuel pools are located below ground or otherwise protected.
... Pools are and will continue to be needed at all nuclear plants for the foreseeable future, the panel stressed, noting that fuel newly removed from the reactor needs about five years cooling time in a water pool before it can be loaded into casks. For older fuel, however, dry storage has two advantages. It is a passive system that relies on air circulation for cooling, and it divides the spent fuel inventory into a number of individual, robust containers that contain only a small amount of the total inventory. Different dry cask systems available on the US market differed only slightly in robustness under different terrorist attack scenarios, the panel found.
March 13, 2004
March 3, 2004
December 31, 2003
November 29, 2003
July 21, 2003
June 21, 2003
April 24, 2003
Bubble from pool and iodine alarm prompt Alert at Perry - see Event report.
April 15, 2003