May 19, 2004

* Brunswick to get IAEA OSART team inspection in 2005

March 30, 2004

* Cook-2 - reactor trip from 100% power, apparently due to a surveillance test

March 29, 2004

* Cooper - both EDGs found inoperable due to closed valve between two fuel oil tanks

* South Texas Project-1 - valve not fully closed, could have caused control room habitability problems during a large break LOCA

* Vogtle-1 - manual reactor trip due to feedwater pump overspeed which could not be controlled

* Robinson-2 - HPSI pump unavailable for 25 minutes as C taken out of service, B realigned, and A restored

March 16, 2004

* Nine Mile Point-2 - during shutdown, LCO requiring, uh, shutdown was entered

March 8, 2004

* Millstone-2 - manual reactor trip from full power after feed pump wouldn't reset

* Susquehanna - outage work involves deenergizing safety parameter display system

* Susquehanna - diesel generator autostart when incorrect fuses removed during maintenance

* Wolf Creek - switchyard equipment problem caused loss of power; EDG autostarted

December 5, 2003

* Reportability consideration: Brunswick-2 - HPCI system valve was left in locked closed position, but the mistake was identified prior to returning system to operable status

* St Lucie-2 - reactor manually tripped due to bearing failure on a condensate pump

August 18, 2003

* Wolf Creek - trip from full power after unexplained feedwater isolation

August 15, 2003

* Fermi - potential unmonitored release path identified by NRC inspectors

* Fermi - if LOCA occurred when offsite voltage was degraded, would diesels start quick enough to protect safety-related equipment?

November 17, 2003

Hope Creek - salt spray from hurricane dries, leads to reactor scram

The Hope Creek reactor scrammed on September 19, 2003 at 8:41 pm, partly because of salt on outdoor equipment. Here's the story: On September 18 and 19, the site was impacted by Hurricane Isabel's high winds (gusts at Hope Creek exceeded 60 mph at times) and the storm surge of the Delaware estuary. The winds and rough surf caused switchyard components at the plant to become coated with salt. Rain accompanying Isabel had stopped prior to the strongest winds thus leaving the salt spray to dry on switchyard components. The Salem - Hope Creek tie line (the line that connects the Hope Creek and Salem switchyards) tripped as a direct result of the salt on switchyard components that provided a low resistance pathway to ground. The actual initiating condition was an electrical transient caused by a 500 KV phase to ground fault. This initiated a trip and isolation of HC 500 KV Bus Section 2. The loss of power prompted autostart of two emergency diesel generators. However, two of the three reactor feed pumps tripped during the event (due to lube oil pump problems). The resultant reduction in feedwater flow prompted the reactor to scram on indication of low reactor water level.

[Source: Licensee Event Report (LER), "Hope Creek Generating Station: Reactor Scram Due To Electrical Transient, Low Reactor Water Level And Loss Of Reactor Feed Pumps A and C", LER #50-354-03-7, November 17, 2003] Note: a PDF copy of the LER is available from NRC at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html, by entering accession number ACN ML033290567

April 29, 2003

Violation cited for failure to use industry operating experience

Monticello was cited for violating 10CFR50 requirement that preventative maintenance activities be evaluated to take into account, where practical, industry-wide operating experience. The violation involved failure to test capacitor in a 1968-vintage replacement part. A wide variety of sources have, for several years, described the age-related failures in the type of capacitor in the replacement part. Here's how the NRC inspection report puts it: NMC's "root cause evaluation documented 15 applicable reported operating experience issues, of which nine were evaluated by Monticello staff between 1999 and 2002. Operating experience reports included GE controller failures and related issues, electrolytic capacitor failures, GE SILs, licensee event reports (LERs), and licensee commitments. The licensee summarized their evaluation results stating that there was a lack of comprehensive work guidance and a lack of a comprehensive aging electronic component management process for maintenance and refurbishment processes, and that the plant staff had not been pro-active in taking action to address component replacement aging/degradation issues." The inspection report is available on nuclear.com as pdf file.

[Postscript, dated May 14, 2003]: A local newspaper discussed this story thusly:

"In January, an aging electronic device that controls key reactor equipment at Xcel Energy's Monticello nuclear power plant failed, setting off a chain of events that resulted in a drop in the reactor's water level. Operators had to reduce power to stabilize the water level to maintain control of the reactor.

"Workers replaced the faulty component with a spare from the warehouse, but it, too, failed. The reason: old age. The replacement part was made in 1968 and workers ignored industry practice and a manufacturer's bulletin and installed the 35-year-old device without first testing it, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said in an inspection report issued last month.

"Although no imminent safety threat was cited by the NRC, it did say the incident Ñ and others Ñ raised questions about maintenance practices at the atomic plant 40 miles northwest of the Twin Cities."

[Source: David Hanners (Pioneer Press), "Plant repair questioned", St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 14, 2003]

April 24, 2003

Bubble from pool and iodine alarm prompt Alert at Perry - see Event report.