May 5, 2007

New BWROG items this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-05-05] 05/17/2007, Notice of Meeting With Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG) re Semi-Annual Senior Management Meeting with the Executive Members of the BWROG. ML071240103 2007-05-04 7 PROJ0691 2007-05-04 2007-05-04 May 4, 2007 MEMORANDUM TO: Stacey L. Rosenberg, Chief Special Projects Branch Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Michelle C. Honcharik, Project Manager /RA/ Special Projects Branch Di

* [2007-05-04] BWROG-88, Rev. 0, TSTF-425, Rev. 1, "Technical Specification Task Force Improved Standard Technical Specifications Change Traveler." ML071150349 2007-04-20 1787 PROJ0753 NUREG-1430 NUREG-1431 NUREG-1432 NUREG-1433 NUREG-1434 BWROG-88, Rev 0 TSTF-425, Rev 1 2007-04-20 2007-05-03 ML071150341+ TSTF-425, Rev. 1 BWROG-88, Rev. 0 NUREGs Affected: Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - RITSTF Initiative

* [2007-05-04] ANP-10256NP, Revision 2, "Methodology for Analysis of Control Rod Withdrawal Error for BWR Plants with ARTS". ML071150407 2007-04-30 47 PROJ0728 ANP-10256NP, Rev 2 2007-04-30 2007-05-03 ML071150392+ ANP-l0256NP Revision 2 Methodology for Analysis of Control Rod Withdrawal Error for BWR Plants with ARTS April 2007 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report Disclaimer Important Notice Regardi

* [2007-05-04] Request for Review and Approval of ANP-10256(P) Revision 2, "Methodology for Analysis of Control Rode Withdrawal Error for BWR Plants with ARTS". ML071150401 2007-04-20 4 PROJ0728 NRC:07:016 2007-04-20 2007-05-03 ML071150392+ A AREVA April 20, 2007 NRC:07:016 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Request for Review and Approval of ANP-10256(P) Revision 2, "Methodology for Analy

* [2007-05-04] Request for Review and Approval of ANP-10256(P) Revision 2, "Methodology for Analysis of Control Rode Withdrawal Error for BWR Plants with ARTS". ML071150392 2007-05-03 ML071150401+ML071150407+ML071150417+ FNWEBNAVIGATE=1.0 SYSTEMTYPE=MEZZANINE DOCUMENTID=071150392 STARTPAGE=1 LIBRARYNAME=ml_adams^hqntad01

* [2007-05-02] 03/22/2007 - 03/23/2007-DCWG Public Meeting Summary Points of Contact. ML071060167 2007-04-12 2 PROJ0738 PROJ0740 PROJ0741 PROJ0742 PROJ0743 PROJ0744 PROJ0745 PROJ0755 PROJ0756 2007-04-12 2007-05-01 ML070930030+ NRC/NRO Project Contacts Project Name NRC Contact NRC Branch Chief ABWR Design Topical Reports George Wunder (301) 415-1494 Mohammed Shuaibi

* [2007-05-02] Project No. 704 - BWR Vessel and Internals Inspection Summaries for Spring 2006 Outages. ML071130273 2007-04-19 116 PROJ0704 2007-104 2007-04-19 2007-05-01 ELECTRIC POWER - I~2 I~RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2007-104 BWR Vessel & Internals Project (BWRVIP) April 19, 2007 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 115 55 Rockville P Ike Rockville, MD 20852 Attention

February 22, 2007

Proposed Revisions to Standard Review Plan (SRP) sections on Accident Analysis and BWR Core Stability

On March 8, 2007, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) is scheduled to hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff regarding proposed revisions to SRP Sections 15.0, Accident Analysis - Introduction, and 15.9, BWR Core Stability. This session is slated for 10:30 am to noon. The meeting is to be held at NRC's Rockville Maryland headquarters -- building TWFN, in conference room T-2B3.

[Source: Meeting Notice for Federal Register, 540th Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards -- ML070400481]

September 23, 2005

* Evolution of the General Electric BWR

August 15, 2005

BWR fleet advances and prospects

Boiling water reactors (BWRs) in the United States have transitioned over the past 30 yr from 7 x 7 and 8 x 8 fuels, 12-month cycles, and batch average burnups of 30 GWd/tonne U to 10 x 10 fuel, 18- to 24-month cycles, batch average burnups of 50 GWd/tonne U, and 5% power uprates in the 1990s. The next step for BWRs in the new millennium is 24-month cycles and extended power uprates as high as 120% power. These operating conditions lead to large reload fuel batch sizes (up to 45% of the core) that result in lower batch average discharge burnups (~45 GWd/tonne U).

[Source: Craig Brown et al., "Extended Power Uprates and 2-yr Cycles for BWRs - Where Do We Go from Here?", Nuclear Technology 151(2):120-125, August 2005]

September 3, 2004

* Oyster Creek - reactor power exceeded licensed limit for three days

* Grand Gulf - evaluation of effect of degraded pipe supports

August 16, 2004

* Brunswick-1 - loss of offsite power for 4 hours due to lockout trip of Station Auxiliary Transformer; reactor tripped too; Unusual Event declared

* Brunswick-1 - one of the standby gas trains tripped due to overheating during loss of offsite power event

* Columbia - reactor manually scrammed during startup

* Grand Gulf - pipe supports found degraded - High Pressure Core Spray and a Standby Service Water system declared inoperable

* River Bend - reactor scrammed upon partial loss of offsite power

* Susquehanna-1 - SPDS wasn't working for 11 hours

* Susquehanna-2 - SPDS wasn't working for almost 10 hours

June 2, 2004

* Nine Mile Point-2 - Shutdown Cooling isolated due to a pressure spike while warming up the piping

* Cooper - HPCI declared inoperable, although could be manually started

May 19, 2004

* Vermont Yankee - two of twenty cracks found in steam dryer warranted repair

March 27, 2004

* Irradiated metal - weldability questions from NRC to BWR Vessel Internals Project

March 26, 2004

* BWR - bigger wetwells in Mark III containments minimize pressure during DBA-LOCA

March 24, 2004

* Susquehanna-1 - reactor vessel penetration crack discovered

* Monticello - Jan 26 filter train event would not have caused low flow

March 23, 2004

* Clinton - reactor scram from 93% power due to generator overvoltage trip

March 22, 2004

* Perry - test of manual scram channel caused breakers to trip, many valves to close

* Limerick-1 - HPCI inoperable due to hand switch broken after successful system test

* Susquehanna - bucket truck work at cooling tower shorted 230KV line, injuring workers there and in plant

March 18, 2004

* Peach Bottom-3 - inoperable HPCI - 14-day LCO

March 16, 2004

* Nine Mile Point-2 - during shutdown, LCO requiring, uh, shutdown was entered

March 9, 2004

* Peach Bottom-2 - HPCI system failed test, as torus suction valve opened only halfway, leaving only CST as source of water

March 8, 2004

* Millstone-2 - manual reactor trip from full power after feed pump wouldn't reset

* Susquehanna - outage work involves deenergizing safety parameter display system

* Susquehanna - diesel generator autostart when incorrect fuses removed during maintenance

March 5, 2004

* Susquehanna - RCIC steam supply failed LLRT

March 4, 2004

* Hatch - diesel generator autostart

February 27, 2004

* BWR - Potential Adverse Flow Effects from Power Uprates

February 24, 2004

* Oyster Creek violation - wrong breaker switched off by operator (but the good news is that discovery and corrective action during the non-emergency situation demonstrates that operator recovery credit is appropriate for this electrical bus

December 12, 2003

* Dresden-2 - Stator Cooling runback prompts manual scram from 96% power

December 11, 2003

* Peach Bottom-2 - HPCI system Torus check valve found to allow reverse flow

* Perry - Dec 17 public meeting in Lisle IL re emergency service water pump failure

December 8, 2003

* Hope Creek - during planned shutdown, transient low reactor level (+2") occurred

November 12, 2003

Quad Cities-1 - Steam Dryer Damage

On November 12, 2003, Quad Cities Unit 1 entered a forced outage to inspect and repair the unitŐs steam dryer. Thru-wall cracking was found in the upper dryer hood cover plate in the 270-degree azimuth of the dryer. The plate is a 1/2-inch thick cover plate welded in place with internal bracing, and the cracking is in the base metal of the plate. A piece of the plate, approximately 7 by 9 inches, cracked off and is currently missing. Inspections of the main steam lines have not indicated any evidence of the missing piece, and the licensee plans to check the annulus of the reactor for the missing piece next. Initial inspections inside the steam dryer also identified cracking and damage to internal support bracing. The licensee has assembled a team of Exelon, General Electric, and industry experts to assess the damage and develop repairs and corrective actions.

[Source: NRC/NRR, in NRC Office of EDO, "Weekly Information Report, Week Ending November 21, 2003", SECY-03-0207, December 1, 2003, ACN ML033360224]

November 10, 2003

Dresden-2 Startup - Bypassing of Containment Pressure Suppression Function

On November 10, 2003, the plant was in startup mode. After completing the Unit 2 Refueling Outage 18 (D2R18), control room operators determined that both the torus and drywell purge valves were simultaneously left open, thus directly connecting the torus air space to the drywell. This bypassed the pressure suppression function of the torus water and put the unit in an unanalyzed condition. The containment pressure suppression function is credited in the loss-of-coolant accident analysis to limit drywell pressure. It accomplishes this by condensing steam from the drywell as it passes through torus water. Control room operators immediately restored proper valve alignment. The licensee reported the incident to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), performed a prompt investigation, and implemented interim corrective actions. A more in depth root cause evaluation will be conducted by the licensee. The NRC resident inspectors are following the licenseeŐs root cause determination and corrective action.

[Source: NRC/NRR, in NRC Office of EDO, "Weekly Information Report, Week Ending November 21, 2003", SECY-03-0207, December 1, 2003, ACN ML033360224]

August 22, 2003

* Columbia - RCIC removed from service

* Oyster Creek - reactor trip; one control rod might not have fully inserted

August 19, 2003

Sweden - criminal charges against Barsebaeck plant referred to prosecutor

Sweden's Act on Nuclear Activities codifies a central tenet for reactor safety: "This is a basic principle, that you shut down if something's not right and you cannot immediately find out why", is how Judith Melin, Director General of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) described the requirement at a press conference today. SKI has concluded that Barsebaeck-2 management violated this requirement when it allowed the plant to continue operating after an unsuccessful January 3, 2003 attempt to correct an abnormal flow condition in feedwater system. The flow problem had been noticed months earlier. When the plant finally shut down on January 16, it was discovered that some components called thermal mixers, which had been replaced during summer outage, had broken and pieces had come loose. Christer Viktorsson, director of SKI's Reactor Safety Office, told the press conference that there was a risk of eventual fuel damage and safety margins were compromised.

The regulators concluded that the continued operation in the face of uncertainty represents a clear violation of the law, at least for the post-January 3 period, and very possibly even during prior period. This is the first time that SKI has referred criminal charges related to reactor safety to a prosecutor. The regulators also have concluded that there's a safety culture problem at the plant, and will not allow Barsebaeck to restart until specified improvements are made.

Barsebaeck management disagrees with the regulator's conclusions. Their position is that neither regulations nor laws were broken.

[Refs: Associated Press, "Swedish prosecutors asked to investigate alleged violation of safety standards at nuclear plant", August 19, 2003; BBC News, "European press review: Nuclear no", August 20, 2003; Radio Sweden (Stockholm), "Criminal investigation into Swedish nuclear power plant", August 20, 2003; and Ariane Sains (Stockholm), "SKI files legal case against Barsebaeck", Nucleonics Week, August 21, 2003, p. 1]

August 18, 2003

MSIV LLRT approach - potential generic issue at BWRs

NRC inspectors questioned Columbia Generating Station's practice of using instrument air to close main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) before local leak rate testing (LLRT). The instrument air system provides more pressure than the safety-related air accumulators that serve as design basis for MSIV operation, so the seal tightness conditions being tested weren't the same conditions desired to be tested. Calls to five other BWRs revealed that none of them actually tested the design basis conditions. Columbia's MSIVs did pass proper test when performed. For more info, see Columbia - MSIV LLRT had never been done right, and error may be pervasive at BWRs.

* Columbia - Loss of Shutdown Cooling events

* Columbia - fluctuations in digital hydraulic control system caused core power to oscillate by about 3% every 7 seconds for about 35 minutes

* Columbia - MSIV closure tests since 1989 used inadequate GE SIL instead of required ASME method [note: this is different than the LLRT story described above]

* Columbia - drywell under-vessel area radiological stanchion out of place

* Columbia - Turbine trip/reactor scram due to chafed wires on non-safety-related transformer prompts replacement of similar wiring, as it should have when the same problem caused trip 3 years ago

August 15, 2003

* Fermi - potential unmonitored release path identified by NRC inspectors

July 21, 2003

* BWR fuel bowing watch - Clinton, Nine Mile Point 2, Fermi 2, Grand Gulf, River Bend, Limerick and Perry

July 14, 2003

* Fermi - valve failed to close - HPCI main steam supply outboard containment isolation valve

July 2, 2003

* Monticello - door between motor control centers not latched for a few minutes

July 1, 2003

* Brunswick-1 - RCS leakage rose from 0.63 gpm to 2.69 gpm, prompting shutdown

* Columbia-2 - reactor trip after turbine trip (cause unknown)

* Perry - Unusual Event prompted by Ohio earthquake (3.4 on Richter scale)

May 21, 2003

Oyster Creek electrical problem prompts forced outage

Oyster Creek is in its first unscheduled outage since November 2001. Power was lost to half the plant's vital equipment at approximately 12:30 am Tuesday, due to a malfunction in an electrical bus. Operators manually shut down the plant at that time. Plant vice president Ernest Harkness declined to estimate when the plant would restart. [Source: Associated Press, Oyster Creek nuclear plant shut down after power interruption>, May 21, 2003]

April 24, 2003 - Thunderstorm damage caused Grand Gulf to scram. Partial loss of offsite power. See event report.