| Seabrook news |
| nuclear.com | Nuclear Power | Other FP&L plants | other dry/ambient PWRs | Radiation | Spent fuel | Bookstore | Gift Shop | About nuclear.com |
|
Seabrook FAQs
* Seabrook station has a plant web site. * FPL also has a Seabrook web page on the corporate site. * NRC has a performance indicator and inspection finding matrix webpage for Seabrook. * When Public Service of New Hampshire began constructing Seabrook in 1976, it envisioned two reactors at
a cost of less than $1 billion. But Seabrook, the last atomic power plant to be built in the
United States, became the focal point of anti-nuclear opposition in the 1970s, and because of
opposition to nuclear energy and the utility's financial problems, only one unit was built.
Construction on the second unit stopped in 1984. In 1988 Public Service declared
bankruptcy. By the time the first unit's 1,150-megawatt reactor went on line in August 1990, the plant had
cost $6.5 billion. [Ref: Associated Press, "Seabrook dome to be scrapped", The Union Leader (Manchester NH), June 19, 2003, p. A1]
|
Seabrook news
June 30, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-06-30] IR 05000443-07-007; on 05/14/2007 - 05/17/2007; Seabrook Station, Unit 1; Supplemental Inspection; IP 95001, "Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area." ML071730068 2007-06-21 13 05000443 NPF-086 IR-07-007 2007-06-21 2007-06-29 June 21, 2007 Mr. Gene St. Pierre Site Vice President FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK GENERATING STATION - NRC SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000 * [2007-06-30] Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 - Draft Request for Additional Information (RAI), Conversion to NEI 99-01, Revision 4, Emergency Action Level Basis (TAC MD3927) ML071800039 2007-06-29 6 05000443 TAC MD3927 2007-06-29 2007-06-29 June 29, 2007 MEMORANDUM TO: Harold K. Chernoff, Chief Plant Licensing Branch I-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: G. Edward Miller, Project Manager /ra/ Plant Lice * [2007-06-29] Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 - Response to Bulletin 2004-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors," (TAC MC3511) ML071300431 2007-06-20 6 05000443 BL-04-001 TAC MC3511 2007-06-20 2007-06-28 June 20, 2007 Mr. Gene F. St. Pierre, Site Vice President c/o James M. Peschel Seabrook Station FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - RESPONSE TO June 23, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-06-19] IR 05000443-07-006, on 03/19/2007 - 04/26/2007, Seabrook Station, Unit 1, Component Design Bases Inspection ML071590071 2007-06-08 41 05000443 NPF-086 IR-07-006 2007-06-08 2007-06-18 June 8, 2007 Mr. Gene St. Pierre Site Vice President FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS INSPECTION REPORT 0500044 June 16, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-06-15] Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 - Response to Generic Letter 2006-02 "Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power" (TAC No. MD1032) ML071370638 2007-06-06 5 05000443 GL-06-002 TAC MD1032 2007-06-06 2007-06-14 June 6, 2007 Mr. Gene F. St. Pierre, Site Vice President c/o James M. Peschel Seabrook Station P. O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 2006-02 ' * [2007-06-14] IR 05000443-07-403, on 04/30/2007 - 05/04/2007; Seabrook Nuclear Power Station; Physical Protection ML071570035 2007-06-05 5 05000443 NPF-086 IR-07-403 2007-06-05 2007-06-13 SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION June 5, 2007 Enclosure Contains Safeguards Information. When Separated from enclosure, this document is not Safeguards Information. Mr. Gene St. Pierre Site Vice June 9, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-06-09] Seabrook - Steam Generator Inservice Inspection ML071510197 2007-05-23 6 05000443 SBK-L-07088 2007-05-23 2007-06-08 FPL Energy Seabrook Station FPL Energy Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 (603) 773-7000 May 23, 2007 Docket No. 50-443 SBK-L-07088 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Des * [2007-06-07] LER 07-002-00 for Seabrook Regarding Incorrect Valve Stroke Time Renders Emergency Feedwater Pump Inoperable ML071490502 2007-05-24 5 05000443 SBK-L-07095 LER 07-002-00 2007-05-24 2007-06-06 FPL E9809V Seabrook Station FPL Energy Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 (603) 773-7000 May 24, 2007 Docket No. 50-443 SBK-L-07095 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Co * [2007-06-07] Press Release-I-07-033 - William Raymond Named NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant ML071570014 2007-06-05 1 05000443 Press Release-I-07-033 2007-06-05 2007-06-06 NRC NEWS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs, Region I 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pa. www.nrc.gov No. I-07-033 June 5, 2007 Contact: Diane Screnci, 610/337-5330 Email: May 26, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-05-26] Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 - Correction of Amendment Re: Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-449, "Steam Generator Tube Integrity," (TAC No. MD0696) ML071000446 2007-05-17 4 05000443 NPF-086 TAC MD0696 2007-05-17 2007-05-25 ML071420135+ May 17, 2007 Mr. Gene F. St. Pierre, Site Vice President c/o James M. Peschel Seabrook Station PO Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - CORRECTION OF AMENDMENT RE: * [2007-05-26] Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1-Correction of Tech Specs for Amendment Re: Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-449, "Steam Generator Tube Integrity," (TAC No. MD0696) ML071380443 2007-05-17 6 05000443 NPF-086 TAC MD0696 2007-05-17 2007-05-25 ML071420135+ ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 115 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-86 DOCKET NO. 50-443 Replace the following page of Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 with the attached revised pag * [2007-05-25] Seabrook Station, Revised No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination for License Amendment Request 06-03, "Application for Amendment to the Technical Specifications for Miscellaneous Changes." ML071360401 2007-05-14 7 05000443 NPF-086 SBK-L-07087 TAC MD2791 2007-05-14 2007-05-24 FPL Energy Seabrook Station FPL Energy P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 Seabrook Station (603) 773-7000 May 14, 2007 Docket No. 50-443 SBK-L-07087 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docume May 19, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-05-19] IR 05000443-07-002, on 1/1/2007-3/31/2007; Seabrook Station, Unit 1; Identification and Resolution of Problems. ML071300506 2007-05-10 33 05000443 NPF-086 IR-07-002 2007-05-10 2007-05-18 May 10, 2007 Mr. Gene St. Pierre Site Vice President FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC Seabrook Station c/o Mr. James M. Peschel P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION R * [2007-05-19] Seabrook Station Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information, Generic Letter 2006-03, "Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier Configurations" (TAC No. MD1631). ML071070044 2007-05-10 5 05000443 TAC MD1631 2007-05-10 2007-05-18 May 10, 2007 Mr. Gene F. St. Pierre, Site Vice President c/o James M. Peschel Seabrook Station FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC PO Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL I * [2007-05-19] Seabrook, Unit 1 - Correction to Administrative Change to Facility Operating License in Conjunction With the Commission Order EA-06-037 and Revisions to Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards (TAC No. MD2277). ML071020030 2007-05-10 5 05000443 NPF-086 EA-06-037 TAC MD2277 2007-05-10 2007-05-18 May 10, 2007 Mr. Gene F. St. Pierre, Site Vice President c/o James M. Peschel Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - CORRECTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE * [2007-05-15] Annual Assessment Letter EOC 2006 - Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (Report 05000443-07-001). ML070610364 2007-03-02 6 2007-03-02 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] IR 05000443-06-016; Florida Power and Light Energy Seabrook, LLC; 09/18/2006 - 01/11/2007; Seabrook Station, Unit 1. ML070510065 2007-02-16 20 2007-02-16 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] 03/29/2007 Meeting Notice for Annual Assessment Meeting with FPL Energy Management to Discuss NRC's Assessment of the Safety Performance of the Seabrook Station for Calendar Year 2006. ML070720415 2007-03-13 5 2007-03-13 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] 03/29/2007 Slides, "End of the Presentation," from Seabrook Station Annual Assessment Meeting for EOC 2006-07. ML070800119 2007-03-21 20 2007-03-21 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] Press Release-I-07-009 - NRC to Discuss 2006 Assessment for Seabrook Nuclear Plant at Public Meeting Scheduled for March 29. ML070810372 2007-03-23 2 2007-03-23 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] Seabrook Confirmatory Action Letter NRR-07-001, Pressurizer Dissimilar Metal (Alloy 82/182) Butt Weld Inspections. ML070610585 2007-03-12 5 2007-03-12 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] Seabrook Station Unit 1, Technical Specifications, Issuance of Amendment Re: Mode Change Limitations (TAC No. MD1515). ML070470474 2007-02-09 26 2007-02-09 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] Seabrook Station Unit 1, Technical Specifications, Issuance of Amendment Regarding TSTF -449 "Steam Generator Tube Integrity" TAC No. MD0696. ML070880286 2007-03-28 42 2007-03-28 2007-05-14 ML070510645+ * [2007-05-15] Seabrook Station, 2006 Annual Report of Primary Coolant Specific Activity. ML070570077 2007-02-09 1 2007-02-09 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] Seabrook Station, 2006 Annual Report of Removable Contamination from Sealed Source or Fission Detector. ML070570074 2007-02-20 1 2007-02-20 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 Administrative Change to Facility Operating License in Conjunction with the Commission Order EA-06-037 & Revisions to Physical Security, Training & Qualification, & Safeguards Contingency Plan. ML070260441 2007-03-29 6 2007-03-29 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] Seabrook, Semi-Annual Fitness-For-Duty Report for July-December 2006. ML070650406 2007-02-26 4 2007-02-26 2007-05-14 * [2007-05-15] Seabrook, Unit 1 - Supplemental Response Regarding Inspection and Mitigation of Alloy 82/182 Pressurizer Butt Welds. ML070530548 2007-02-21 3 2007-02-21 2007-05-14 May 12, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-05-11] Enclosure 1 to SBK-L-07074, Effluent Release Data as Required by Regulatory Guide 1.21. ML071220463 2007-04-27 55 05000443 RG 1.021 SBK-L-07074 2007-04-27 2007-05-10 ML071220456+ ENCLOSURE 1 TO SBK-L-07074 Effluent Release Data as Required by Regulatory Guide 1.21 EFFLUENT AND WASTE DISPOSAL ANNUAL REPORT Supplemental Information 2006 Facility: Seabrook Station Unit 1 * [2007-05-11] Seabrook Station - 2006 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report. ML071220456 2007-05-10 ML071220458+ML071220461+ML071220463+ FNWEBNAVIGATE=1.0 SYSTEMTYPE=MEZZANINE DOCUMENTID=071220456 STARTPAGE=1 LIBRARYNAME=ml_adams^hqntad01 * [2007-05-11] Seabrook Station - Submittal of 2006 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report. ML071220458 2007-04-27 2 05000443 SBK-L-07074 2007-04-27 2007-05-10 ML071220456+ o I=PL :nergy Seabrook Station FPL Energy Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 (603) 773-7000 April 27, 2007 Docket No. 50-443 SBK-L-07074 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn.: Documen * [2007-05-11] Enclosure 4 to SBK-L-07074, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Rev 30. ML071220461 2006-05-30 428 05000443 SBK-L-07074 2006-05-30 2007-05-10 ML071220456+ ENCLOSURE 4 TO SBK-L-07074 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) RMD Controlled Copy PROGRAM MANUAL Offsite Dose Calculation Manual SORC Review: 06-021 Date: 5/30/06 Effective Date: 6-05-06 ODCM Rev. May 5, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-05-05] Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Draft Request for Additional Information (TAC No. MD2791). ML071240449 2007-05-03 3 05000443 NPF-086 TAC MD2791 2007-05-03 2007-05-04 May 3, 2007 MEMORANDUM TO: Harold K. Chernoff, Chief Plant Licensing Branch I-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: G. Edward Miller, Project Manager /ra/ Plan April 28, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-04-28] 05/09/2007 Notice of Meeting with Industry to Discuss a Reactor Oversight Process Performance Indicator Frequently Asked Question. ML071150295 2007-04-26 4 05000443 05000444 2007-04-26 2007-04-27 April 26, 2007 MEMORANDUM TO: James W. Andersen, Chief Performance Assessment Branch Division of Inspection and Regional Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Mark E. Tonacci /RA/ Performance Assessment * [2007-04-27] Seabrook Station, Notification of RCS Leakage Monitoring Change. ML071080347 2007-03-29 1 05000443 SBK-L-07064 2007-03-29 2007-04-26 ao I=PL :nergY Seabrook Station FPL Energy Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 (603) 773-7000 March 29, 2007 Docket No. 50-443 SBK-L-07064 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Des * [2007-04-24] LER 07-001-00 for Seabrook Regarding Noncompliance with the Requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.3. ML071030334 2007-04-12 5 05000443 SBK-L-07069 LER 07-001-00 2007-04-12 2007-04-23 FPL Energv Seabrook Station FPL Energy Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 (603) 773-7000 April 12, 2007 Docket No. 50-443 SBK-L-07069 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document April 21, 2007 New this week from NRC Public Document Room * [2007-04-17] 03/29/2007 Summary of Annual Assessment Meeting with FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC. ML071010040 2007-04-10 2 05000443 NPF-086 2007-04-10 2007-04-16 April 10, 2007 MEETING SUMMARY LICENSEE: FPL ENERGY SEABROOK, LLC FACILITY: SEABROOK STATION SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MARCH 29, 2007 ANNUAL ASSESSMENT MEETING WITH FPL ENERGY SEABROOK On March 29, 2007, at 6:30 p.m., an An Recent NRC inspections * (Released November 15) Seabrook report 50-443-2003-4 * (Released May 30) Seabrook safeguards report 50-443-2003-7 * Seabrook report 50-443-2003-2 * Seabrook safety systems report 50-443-2003-5 * Seabrook report 50-443/2002-6 June 30, 2005 Summary of Plant Status - April 1 to June 30, 2005 The plant began the period in the tenth refueling outage (OR10). On April 30, 2005, the unit entered Mode 2 and achieved criticality. On May 1, the reactor was manually tripped following a main turbine trip on high vibration. On May 2, the unit returned to power operations. The main generator breaker was closed and later reopened as part of turbine vibration data gathering. On May 3, the main generator breaker was closed following balancing of the turbine. On May 4, power was reduced and the main generator was taken offline to repair a leak on a non-safety related main steam drain line. The repair was completed on May 4 and the unit was synchronized to the grid. On May 10, the unit reached full power operation. On May 10, the unit increased reactor thermal power to 3587 megawatt thermal after receiving a 5.2 percent power uprate. On May 20, the unit was reduced to 55 percent power to perform planned maintenance on the ŅAÓ main feedwater pump. On May 21, 2005, the unit was returned to full rated thermal power and operated at or near full power through the end of the period. [Source: Glenn Dentel (NRC senior resident inspector), et al., Seabrook Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-443/2005-5, July 22, 2005, ML052030511] June 2, 2005 *
Rally pleases local officials
Portsmouth Mayor Evelyn Sirrell said she hopes President Bush will ultimately be convinced that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard does not belong the base closing list because of its vital need in homeland security. "What is he thinking? We have a nuclear power plant in Seabrook and what's going to happen if terrorists come here. They've got no security in this area whatsoever," she said. "I just don't feel safe now. Any of those terrorists could come in and do a job on us," she said. If the shipyard is not there, the Coast Guard cutters will not have a berth. Sirrell said she hoped more people will be sending letters to her in support of the shipyard. June 1, 2005 *
Congressmen claim more Seabrook security problems
Reps. Edward Markey and John Tierney said Wednesday in a second letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the agency "take immediate action to protect public safety" at Seabrook. They said additional safety issues were raised by a Seabrook employee regarding defective security cameras and the plant's failure to conduct a security analysis. "Last week I learned that the security fence at Seabrook has been broken for months," Markey said. "Now it turns out that this is just the tip of the iceberg. The fence is broken, the security cameras don't work, and some required security analysis hasn't even been performed. It seems the plant motto is 'see no evil, hear no evil, maybe no evil exists.'" May 29, 2005 *
Public has right to know about failded Seabrook Station fence
The idea that the security fence surrounding the Seabrook Station nuclear power plant has not been operating since it was installed late last year is frightening enough. But what is more frightening - and perhaps even more dangerous - is the ability of plant personnel and owners to hide behind the laws enacted since Sept. 11, 2001, in order to keep their failures quiet. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission used to put incident reports on its Web site. It was a way for the public to know just how safe their local power plants are. However, in the paranoia that has gripped this country since 9/11/01, this - as well as other types of information formerly accessible to the public - is no longer available. The fact is neither we, nor you the reader, would have known about the nuclear plantÕs failure to adequately install or test one of the primary safeguards against a terrorist attack had it not been for the willingness of someone inside the plant, who was fed up with how security was being mismanaged, to come forward. This employee took a risk. It showed courage and more concern for the community surrounding the nuclear plant than was evident from the plantÕs management, which failed to do the things necessary to find out if this perimeter intrusion fence was working properly. It makes one wonder just what else is going wrong inside our nuclear plants, chemical-production facilities, ports and airports that we citizens will never be able to find out about - and, therefore, never be able to exert the pressure necessary to change them - because that information is deemed too sensitive to be released. In fact, when we asked a Seabrook Station official to confirm the fence failure, he said he could not because he would be in violation of federal law. He also warned that sharing this important information with our readers could bring federal fines and punishments. We decided to write the story because we believe our readers, almost all of whom live within the 10-mile evacuation zone surrounding Seabrook Station, need to know the failure of a primary security system had gone undetected for nearly eight months. We also factored in information from Seabrook officials that they had immediately embarked on correcting the problem and there are sufficient redundant systems in place to keep the plant and the public safe. But we were told at least one other news organization had information about the fence failure and decided not to release it to the public. We can only assume it was because of the threat of federal reprisals. There is certainly a concern that reporting on security failures at potential terrorist targets could make that information known to those willing to take advantage of those soft spots in order to wreak havoc on our country and our citizens. However, in many cases the option is to simply take the word of those with vested interests in portraying an aura of security when none actually exists, as the Seabrook Station event shows. One of the roles of the media is to be the watchdog that barks at night, and tells everyone in the house something is wrong - especially if the back gate is open. Increasingly, there is a desire of policymakers, especially the current majority party in power, to muzzle the dog. Federal policymakers would like less public oversight, but more knowledge of your most intimate details. A free press is a vital part of our system of checks and balances, and was very much envisioned by our founding fathers. The Seabrook Station incident shows how these issues play out right here in our back yard. We are best as a community, and as a nation, when we allow openness and public scrutiny of homeland security, when we insist on transparency as to what our government "of the people" has done lately - or has not done - to protect us. May 27, 2005 *
Reps: Seabrook security fence useless
Sandra Gavutis, executive director of nuclear watchdog group C-10 in Newburyport, said the organization has heard about "a lot of burnout and discontent among the guards" from whistleblowers. She said the public is given little information from the plant, particularly since the events of Sept. 11, 2001. "Since 9/11, when information like this comes to the public, it just makes us that more skeptical," she said. "ItÕs a breach in the trust of the plant. They keep saying, Ōbe assured, weÕre as concerned about safety as you are.Õ This didnÕt come from the plant, it came from a whistleblower. "ItÕs a real lapse of security, there should be real concerns," said Gavutis, "the installer, the NRC, the utility have fallen short in protecting our safety." Gavutis said whistleblowers who come to C-10 are referred to either Markey or Tierney. Seabrook Station unveiled $14 million in security upgrades, including the intruder-detection system, last fall. The upgrades were mandated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2003, with a completion date of this Oct. 29. The NRC required enhancements to the physical structure, training and employee qualifications and a contingency plan, leaving the implementation up to the individual plants. Seabrook town officials expressed no real alarm at the alleged lack of security at the plant. "It really didnÕt cause me any concern," said Fire Chief Jeff Brown. "I expect theyÕre professionals at what they do." "I just feel the agencies responsible will take care of this," said Selectwoman Cora Stockbridge. "I have faith they will take care of it." Town Manager Fred Welch said on Wednesday he had not been in contact with plant officials concerning the alleged security breach. *
Inoperable detection system
There's some scary things in the document discussing security fence at Seabrook. The public relations spokesman for the Seabrook nuclear power plant makes it abundantly clear that the people who run the operation think that security was never compromised, but itÕs hard not to be more than a little concerned that the "perimeter intrusion detection system" has probably not been working since it was installed more than six months ago. This is a major embarrassment for the plant and its security. The plant didnÕt want this information before the public. It was leaked. And we, for one, are glad it was. This was a serious deficiency in plant security that was mandated after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. We are thankful the NRC discovered the problem and that measures have been taken as a result. We want to believe Griffith when he says weÕre safe and not to worry. But we would rather know that something went wrong and is being fixed than to have had the information hidden from us. And we would feel better about the situation had it been the plant or the NRC that had made the matter public. Translation of some of the scary things in the document: The thing didnÕt work. It would never have worked. Somebody or some people at the plant screwed up. They really dropped the ball on this one. The plantÕs security agency and managers were not doing a good enough job, at least where the detection system was concerned. May 25, 2005 *
Seabrook Station officials say plant remains secure
The Perimeter Intrusion Detection System is a portion of the security fence. PIDS is one of three elements of Seabrook Station's security operation. The others are a variety of physical barriers, which limit entrance options, and an armed security force. The PIDS problem was detected around May 5 during routine testing of the system during an inspection by Region 1 of the NRC. "At no time would we leave any vulnerability unaddressed," Seabrook spokesperson Alan Griffith insisted. "We have multiple layers of security. . . . We have many ways of doing the same thing. At no point have we ever lost our ability to protect the public's health and safety." Griffith said at no time have unauthorized persons ever penetrated the plant due to the PIDS problem. *
Congressmen Claim Homeland Security Lapse At Seabrook
Reps. Edward Markey and John Tierney wrote letter to NRC asking numerous questions about claims that an intruder detection system at Seabrook wasn't installed correctly and did not work, and that the plant forced security guards to work overtime to compensate. "If these allegations are true, they represent a significant homeland security lapse at the Seabrook nuclear power plant, which the licensee appears to be compensating for by creating an overworked, overtired and consequently less effective security guard force," Markey and Tierney wrote in a letter to NRC Chairman Nils Diaz. Plant spokesman Alan Griffith said federal law prohibits him from discussing safety issues, but he said that "at no time has Seabrook ever been in a position that it can't protect public health and safety." He added that the plant's safety systems "are multilayered and not isolated to any one system." And he called the overtime allegation "completely erroneous. We have no idea where Markey is getting this." A Seabrook employee brought the allegations to the attention of Markey's office, the letter says. Markey's office was told the detection system was installed at the plant last year, but that on a recent inspection the NRC concluded it had been installed incorrectly, didn't work and probably needed to be replaced. "In the meantime, Seabrook officials are reportedly using reactor security guard forces to compensate for the inoperable security system, and have violated NRC regulations by forcing these security guards to work excessive amounts of overtime," the letter says. Markey and Tierney asked Diaz whether the inspection occurred and if the NRC would investigate the alleged overtime violations, among other questions. May 24, 2005 *
Nuke plant fence was 'inoperable'
A security fence intended to prevent outside threats to Seabrook Station failed a recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection and was declared inoperable, according to an internal plant document obtained by the Portsmouth Herald. "Security initiated (a) report that on May 5, several Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) zones failed challenge testing during a regional NRC inspection and were declared inoperable," the internal document indicated. "Compensatory measures were implemented immediately following the determination that the zones were inoperable." The fence was installed by a subcontracted engineering firm on Oct. 29, 2004. The requirement to upgrade Seabrook StationÕs fence came from NRC mandates stemming from the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. In response to the failure of the security component, Seabrook Station launched an investigation. Officials identified two basic causes of the failure, according to the internal documents. The first was the "the Perimeter Intrusion Detection System design was inadequate," and the second was that "the system testing performed to commission the system, and subsequent tests to ensure operability, were deficient, which resulted in failure to identify the inadequate design," the documents indicated. Both design of the system and testing procedures did not adhere to NRC guidelines, the internal report said. The report also found two other factors that contributed to the systemÕs failure. The first was that Seabrook StationÕs primary owner, Florida Power, Light and EnergyÕs, review and approval of the system vendor, Proto-Power, "lacked vigor." In fact, the report states that, when FPLEÕs design engineer was questioned about the failure, he stated that "neither the vendor manual nor (NRC regulations) were utilized." The other contributing factor was that the nuclear plant suffered from "inadequate security organizational effectiveness," the report indicated. There was "inadequate monitoring of system performance," "no evidence of management oversight of system testing," and "security human performance observations are performed almost exclusively by Wackenhut personnel and are not self-critical." Wackenhut is the security company hired by Seabrook Station to protect the plant. Alan Griffith, spokesperson for the power plant, said Monday that federal law prevented him from commenting on specific security issues, but said plant security was never threatened. "At no time have we lost our ability to protect public health and safety," he said. Griffith would only say a component of the security system "was not operating the way we wanted it to" during a routine test. He would not say what that component was or when it was tested. "During these routine tests ... you can have a result youÕre not thrilled about, but itÕs not the end of the world," Griffith said. Whenever an issue with a system component comes up, it is immediately addressed by plant staff, Griffith added. "The bottom line is Seabrook Station is safe; it is secure," he said. * 2005-03-28: FPL's Seabrook N.H. nuke up to 95 pct power * 2005-03-24: FPL N.H. Seabrook nuke exits outage * 2005-03-23: Update 1-FPL shuts New Hampshire Seabrook nuke * 2005-03-17: NRC meet with Seabrook nuclear plant to share findings * 2005-03-10: NRC to Discuss 2004 Performance Assessment for Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant * 2005-03-02: Seabrook gets OK to boost power output * 2005-03-01: NRC Approves Power Uprate for Seabrook Station September 22, 2004 * Seabrook plant - Iran and al Qaeda's attack plans and prep February 18, 2004 * Seabrook - mail handler's reaction-like symptoms November 15, 2003 Tritium from spent fuel pool in ground water In June 1999, Seabrook discovered tritium activity in a containment annulus ground water sample. The identification of the tritium source was documented in CR 99-2720. Seabrook identified that the tritium source in the ground water was from spent fuel pool (SFP) water. NRC inspectors review Seabrook's groundwater tritium trending and tracking evaluation results, engineering evaluation. Sampling data indicates that Seabrook has been within the radioactive liquid effluent concentration limit for tritium at the site boundary as established in 10 CFR 20, App. B, Table 2 and the ODCM. [Source: Glenn Dentel (Senior Resident Inspector) et al., NRC Inspection Report 50-443-2003-04, p. 18] October 8, 2003 Seabrook finds boron on reactor head, from CRDM housing leak Seabrook shut down Saturday for monthlong refueling. A "very small and recent leak" was discovered Tuesday from a conoseal weld on a CRDM housing -- a pipe that surrounds a mechanism that moves fuel rods in and out of the reactor. Associated Press compared the finding to the hole in the head at Davis-Besse, which seems a bit unwarranted to us here at nuclear.com. "If allowed to accumulate for months or years, the coolant can eat through steel", the AP reports. Plant and NRC spokesfolks are cited as saying that the Seabrook leak "poses no danger and was caught in time to prevent costly damage". The article then cites plant spokesperson as saying that "plant technicians think the leak started in the last two to three weeks". In their initial report to NRC Operations Center, the plant stated that test results indicate that the leak had occurred in the last 2 months. [Refs: Stephen Frothingham (AP writer), "Leak discovered at nuclear plant; no danger to public", The Associated Press, October 8, 2003 12:39 pm ET; and NRC Operations Center, "Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage", Event Notification Report for October 8, 2003, Event Number 40228] September 27, 2003 Operations summary - June 29, 2003 through September 27, 2003 The plant began the period at full rated thermal power and operated at or near full power for the entire report period. [Source: Glenn Dentel (Senior Resident Inspector) et al., NRC Inspection Report 50-443-2003-04] August 14, 2003 August 14 Grid Fluctuation The grid voltage and frequency fluctuations on August 14 resulted in extensive blackouts in the Midwest and Northeast regions. Seabrook experienced a decrease of less than 10% electrical power (approximately 100 MWe). [Source: Glenn Dentel (Senior Resident Inspector) et al., NRC Inspection Report 50-443-2003-04, p. 7] July 1, 2003 * Seabrook-2 - fire in containment during disassembly of containment dome June 19, 2003 "By September, the eyesore should be gone" The steel dome that would have been used for containment building at second Seabrook unit has been rusting near the marshes since construction was stopped in 1984. Plant spokesperson Alan Griffith told Associated Press that when FPL Energy of Florida bought the plant last year, "the first question in the community was, 'What will you do with the rusting eyesore?'" In a memorandum of understanding last year, FPL Energy secured $2 million from a consortium of 11 previous owners for a "beautification fund". The domw will be cut into pieces and trucked away. "By September, the eyesore should be gone", Griffith said. [Ref: Associated Press, "Seabrook dome to be scrapped", The Union Leader (Manchester NH), June 19, 2003, p. A1] |