public affairs contact: Mike McCracken -- Telephone (910) 457-3113; Email -- mike.mccracken@pgnmail.com (last verified, April 2003)

January 17, 2012

* [npp-US-Brunswick] Brunswick: safety analysis had always assumed that fire in turbine building would not affect safe shutdown capability. That was incorrect, as some cables necessary for safe shutdown are routed through turbine building. See LER released today, LER 11-002-00 for Brunswick, Units 1 and 2, Regarding Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition that could Impact Equipment Credited in Safe Shutdown Analysis.

January 12, 2012

* [npp-US-Brunswick] Rev. 4 of the Carolina Power and Light Company and Florida Power Corporation Physical Security Plan, Security Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program has been adopted. Only the cover letter to NRC, from Donna Alexander, Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (Interim), dated Jan 5, is publicly available. She mentions that one of the changes involves the Brunswick plant.

Ms. Alexander is based at PO Box 1551, 411 Fayetteville Street Mall, Raleigh NC 27602. Technical contact is listed as Brian Bernard, Manager - Nuclear Security Services and Emergency Preparedness, at (919) 546-5650

January 5, 2012

* [npp-US-Brunswick] Backup power supply

Last month, both Brunswick units requested a diesel generator Completion Time extension for Technical Specification 3.8.1, 'AC Sources Ð Operating'. But the application was quickly withdrawn. The link is to an email released today, dated Dec 21, informing NRC of the forthcoming withdrawal. The email is from William R. (Bill) Murray, BNP Licensing/Regulatory Programs (910-457-2842, Bill.Murray2@pgnmail.com), with cc to several other folks with Progress addresses (Annette Pope annette.pope@pgnmail.com, Mark Turkal mark.turkal@pgnmail.com, Philip Ballard Philip.Ballard@pgnmail.com, and Robert Rishel Robert.Rishel@pgnmail.com)

January 4, 2012

* [npp-US-Brunswick] NRC inspection report - Fire Protection. NRC's Triennial fire protection inspection was completed in November. Four NRC regional specialists were onsite for approximately two weeks. The inspection report was released today. Included in the inspection was a walkdown of the storage and staging areas for so-called B.5.b equipment to verify that equipment identified for use in the current procedures were available, calibrated, and maintained. [note: B.5.b refers to severe events]

The following licensee contacts were listed in the report:

S. Allen, Fire Protection System Engineer
M. Annacone, Vice President, BNP
J. Becker, Engineering Programs Supervisor
C. Browne, NFPA 805 Project
R. Brusselman, Fire Protection
D. Bryant, Operations Fire Protection
J. Burke, Engineering Director
C. Chan, Safe Shutdown Engineer
D. Dearie, Operations Senior Reactor Operator
P. Dubrouillet, Training Manager
J. Frisco, Plant General Manager
S. Hardy, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Engineer
A. Holder, Corporate Fire Protection
P. Mentel, Support Services Manager
R. Mosier, Corporate Communications
A. Pope, Supervisor Licensing
T. Rouns, Fire Protection Program Manager
K. Sawyer, Operations Training
T. Sherrill, Licensing Engineer
M. Souther, Support Systems Supervisor
R. Stewart, NFPA 805 Project Manager
R. Tart, NFPA 805 Transition Engineer
M. White, Fire Protection Coordinator

January 3, 2012

* [npp-US-Brunswick] Brunswick disagrees with NRC notice of violation re RWCU flow measurement at Unit 2. It is true, Brunswick VP says in a Dec 14 letter, that the inlet flow sensing element was improperly installed. It is not true, however, that that the uncertainty introduced was sufficient to render the system inoperable. The letter includes discussion of the difference between two types of uncertainties ('measureable' vs 'unmeasureable'), and how surveillance testing is designed to account for both types. The letter describes the plant's follow-up investigation. Conclusion: the system was degraded, but not inoperable ["The amount of uncertainty introduced by this condition was not sufficient to render the instrument loop incapable of performing its intended safety function (i.e., assuring that the 300 gpm analytical limit would not be exceeded). Therefore, a violation of TS 3.3.6.1 did not occur."].

* [npp-US-Brunswick] NRC cites Brunswick for inadequate flooding protection, Nuclear Energy International (also via Nevada ANP)

December 31, 2011

* [npp-US-Brunswick] NRC Cites Progress Energy For Inadequate Flood Protection At Brunswick Plant, Ryan Tracy, Dow Jones Newswires (via @kevinmeyerson)