NRC has a performance indicator and inspection finding matrix webpage for each plant. There are separate pages for Unit 1 and Unit 2

February 8, 2008

Braidwood - new site VP is Bryan Hanson, from Clinton

Exelon expects the following promotions to take place over the next couple of weeks:

* Site Vice President, Braidwood, Tom Coutu was named Vice President Midwest Operations

* Site Vice President, Clinton, Brian Hanson was named Site Vice President, Braidwood

[Source: NRC Region III, "Exelon Nuclear announces Executive Realignment", Morning Report, February 7, 2008 -- ACN ML080380472]

June 30, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-06-30] Braidwood Units 1 & 2, 30-Day Report - Radiological Release Below Regulatory Reporting Limits ML071720344 2007-06-21 2 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 BW070048 2007-06-21 2007-06-29 ________ __ _____ Exd n Exelon Generation Company, L~C ~~exe1onco~ com Braidwood Station uc ear ~c~o t ~ ~ o~c ~ June 21, 2007 BW070048 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region Ill 2443 War

* [2007-06-28] 2007/06/25-Comment (9) Submitted by Exelon Generation Company LLC, Darin M. Benyak, on UCS's PRM-73-13 regarding to Amend 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials ML071780418 2007-06-25 1 05000010 05000171 05000237 05000249 05000254 05000265 05000277 05000278 05000295 05000304 05000352 05000353 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 72FR17440 00009 PRM-73-13 2007-06-25 2007-06-27 2007-06-27 Exelon Ceneratlon 4 300 W~nfield Ro

* [2007-06-27] Braidwood Station Management Changes ML071760209 2007-06-25 1 05000456 05000457 MR-III-07-0013 2007-06-25 2007-06-26 Morning Report Date: JUN 25, 2007 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III Licensee/Facility: Notification: 3-2007-0013 06/22/2007 MR Number: EXELON NUCLEAR [1] W-4-LP, [2] W-4-LP Date:

June 23, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-06-23] Braidwood and Byron, Bulletin 2004-01 "Inspection of ALLOY 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space." ML071510535 2007-06-14 6 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 NPF-037 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 BL-04-001 TAC MD3461 TAC MD3462 TAC MD3463 TAC MD3464 2007-06-14 2007-06-22 June 14, 2007 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 W

* [2007-06-21] Participation in pilot program for electronic distribution of correspondence to Exelon Generation Company, LLC ML071620152 2007-06-12 9 05000237 05000249 05000254 05000265 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 05000461 DPR-019 DPR-025 DPR-029 DPR-030 NPF-011 NPF-018 NPF-037 NPF-062 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 2007-06-12 2007-06-20 June 12, 2007 TO: Those on the Attached List SU

* [2007-06-20] 03/20/2007 - Slides to Counterparts Meeting with Exelon to Discuss Current and Planned Licensing Activities and Process - Correction ML071660102 2007-03-20 8 05000219 05000237 05000249 05000254 05000265 05000277 05000278 05000289 05000352 05000353 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 05000461 2007-03-20 2007-06-19 ML071660095+ Counterparts Meeting March 20, 2007 2 Agenda Introductions ¥ Exelon

* [2007-06-20] 03/20/2007 Summary of Category 1 Meeting With Exelon to Discuss Current and Planned Licensing Activities and Processes to Discuss Topics of Common Interest to the Reactor Licensing Programs for Exelon and the NRC Staff ML070930379 2007-06-11 11 05000219 05000237 05000249 05000254 05000265 05000277 05000278 05000289 05000352 05000353 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 05000461 2007-06-11 2007-06-19 ML071660095+ June 11, 2007 LICENSEE: Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) FACI

* [2007-06-19] IA-07-015, Hess, Notice of Violation ML071220127 2007-05-01 5 05000456 05000457 05531018 OP-30480-4 IA-07-015 IA-07-015 2007-05-01 2007-06-18 May 1, 2007 IA-07-015 Michael R. Hess [HOME ADDRESS DELETED UNDER 10 CFR 2.390] SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION Dear Mr. Hess: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received

* [2007-06-19] IR 05000456-07-007 and 05000457-07-007; on 03/12/2007 - 05/01/2007; Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems ML071640143 2007-06-12 36 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 IR-07-007 2007-06-12 2007-06-18 June 12, 2007 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: BRAIDWOOD STATION,

June 16, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-06-15] Press Release-III-07-020 - NRC to Discuss 2006 Performance Assessment for Braidwood Nuclear Power Plant ML071370674 2007-05-17 2 05000456 05000457 Press Release-III-07-020 2007-05-17 2007-06-14 NRC NEWS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2443 Warrenville Road Lisle IL 60532 Web Site: http://www.nrc.gov E-mail: opa3@nrc.gov No. III-07-020 May 17, 2007 CONTACT: Viktoria Mitlyng (630)

* [2007-06-14] 2007/06/12-Comment (9) Submitted by Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Darin M. Benyak on POGO and UCS re Amend 10 CFR Part 50 Concerning Design Basis Threat ML071630541 2007-06-12 2 05000352 05000353 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 72FR14713 00009 PRM-50-83 2007-06-12 2007-06-13 2007-06-12 Exelon Generation www.exeioncorp.com 4300 Winfield Road Nuclear Warrenville, iL 60555 PRM-50-83 (72FR14713) DOCKETED USN RC J

* [2007-06-13] Braidwood, Units 1 and 2, 30-Day Report - Radiological Release Below Regulatory Reporting Limits ML071550455 2007-06-04 2 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 BW070043 2007-06-04 2007-06-12 Exel n. Exelon Gereration Company, LLC Braidwood Station ~5 84 June 4, 2007 BW070043 www.cxeloncorp.co n U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region Ill 2443 Warrenville Road Suite 210 Lisle,

* [2007-06-12] Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2, and Clinton, Unit 1, Additional Information Supporting the 60-Day Response to Generic Letter 2006-03, "Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier Configurations." ML071520085 2007-05-31 5 05000456 05000457 05000461 NPF-062 NPF-072 NPF-077 GL-06-003 RS-07-088 TAC MD1550 TAC MD1551 TAC MD1564 TAC MD1621 TAC MD1622 2007-05-31 2007-06-11 RS-07-088 May 31, 2007 e G Exel6n U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN : Document Control Desk Washingto

June 9, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-06-09] 05/22/2007 - Summary of Public Meeting Between NRC Region III Management and Exelon Generation Company Management to Discuss Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2, End-Of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment ML071550395 2007-06-04 5 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 2007-06-04 2007-06-08 June 4, 2007 LICENSEE: Exelon Generation Company, LLC FACILITY: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE MAY 22, 2007, PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS THE BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, E

June 2, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-06-01] Braidwood, 1 & 2 - RAI related to license amendment request to allow use of AREVA NP INC. advanced Mark-BW(A) fuel assemblies ML071360485 2007-05-22 5 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 TAC MD3079 TAC MD3080 2007-05-22 2007-05-31 May 22, 2007 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNIT

* [2007-06-01] Braidwood, Unit 1, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Spring 2006 Steam Generator Inspection ML071420119 2007-05-21 11 05000456 NPF-072 BW070040 2007-05-21 2007-05-31 Exe~n Exelon GeneTation Company, LLC www.exeloncoTp.com Nuci ear Braidwood Station ~ ~ S~t~S. ~ ~O~C7 May 21, 2007 BW070040 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

* [2007-05-31] Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for 2006 ML071420255 2007-05-31 239 05000456 05000457 2007-05-31 2007-05-30 ML071420252+ V., Docket No: 50-456 50-457 BRAIDWOOD STATION UNITS 1 and 2 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report 1 January Through 31 December 2006 Prepared By Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental Ser

* [2007-05-31] Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2 Annual Radiological Groundwater Protection Progam Report for 2006 ML071420259 2007-05-31 29 05000456 05000457 2007-05-31 2007-05-30 ML071420252+ Docket No: 50-456 50-457 BRAIDWOOD STATION UNITS 1 and 2 Annual Radiological Groundwater Protection Program Report 1 January Through 31 December 2006 Prepared By Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental

* [2007-05-31] Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2, Submittal of 2006 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report ML071410124 2007-05-14 1 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 BW070038 2007-05-14 2007-05-30 ML071420252+ Exelkn ¨ Exelon Generation Company, LLC www.exeloncorp.com Braidwood Station Nuclear 35100 South Route 53, Suite 84 Braceville, IL 60407-9619 May 14, 2007 BW070038 U.S. Nuclear R

May 26, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-05-26] 05/22/2007 Braidwood EOC Meeting Slides - Exelon ML071440470 2007-05-22 12 05000456 05000457 2007-05-22 2007-05-25 Braidwood Generating Station NRC 2006 End of Cycle Meeting Tom Coutu Site Vice President 2 'Plant Performance 2006' Operated Safely and Reliably in 2006 ¥ Achieved 4 million hours without a lost time accident ¥ Capac

* [2007-05-26] 05/22/2007 Braidwood EOC Meeting Slides - NRC ML071440468 2007-05-22 23 05000456 05000457 2007-05-22 2007-05-25 Braidwood Annual Assessment Meeting Braidwood Annual Assessment Meeting Reactor Oversight Program Reactor Oversight Program - CY 2006 CY 2006 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III R

* [2007-05-24] IR 05000456-07-003, 05000457-07-003; 01/01/2007 - 03/31/2007; Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2; Flood Protection Measures ML071350458 2007-05-15 39 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 IR-07-003 2007-05-15 2007-05-23 May 15, 2007 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: BRAIDWOOD STATION, U

* [2007-05-23] Braidwood Units 1 & 2, Byron Units 1 & 2, Supplemental Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors." ML071340060 2007-05-11 4 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 NPF-037 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 BL-04-001 RS-07-060 2007-05-11 2007-05-22 Exelor= Generation www.exeloncorp.corn 4300 Wlnfield Road Warrenville, J 60555 RS-07-060 May 11, 2007 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Do

* [2007-05-23] Braidwood, Byron, Dresden, LaSalle, Quad Cities, and Zion - Letter Transmitting Orders Approving Application Regarding Proposed Corporate Restructuring ML003759727 2000-10-05 7 05000010 05000237 05000249 05000254 05000265 05000295 05000304 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 DPR-002 DPR-019 DPR-025 DPR-029 DPR-030 DPR-039 DPR-048 NPF-011 NPF-018 NPF-037 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 -RFPFR MA9443 MA9444 MA9445 MA9446

* [2007-05-23] Order Approving Application Regarding Proposed Corporate Restructuring ML003764373 2000-10-05 24 05000010 05000237 05000249 05000254 05000265 05000295 05000304 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 DPR-002 DPR-019 DPR-025 DPR-029 DPR-030 DPR-039 DPR-048 NPF-011 NPF-018 NPF-037 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 -RFPFR MA9443 MA9444 MA9445 MA9446

* [2007-05-23] Safety Evaluation Related to Proposed Corporate Restructuring of Commonwealth Edison ML003764385 2000-10-05 5 05000010 05000237 05000249 05000254 05000265 05000295 05000304 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 DPR-002 DPR-019 DPR-025 DPR-029 DPR-030 DPR-039 DPR-048 NPF-011 NPF-018 NPF-037 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 -RFPFR MA9444 MA9445 MA9446 MA9447

* [2007-05-22] Transmittal of WCAP-16401-NP, Revision 0, "Technical Basis for Repair Options for Reactor Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles and Attachment Welds: Byron and Braidwood Units 1 & 2." ML071310117 2007-05-03 48 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 NPF-037 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 RS-07-059 WCAP-16401-NP, Rev 0 2007-05-03 2007-05-21 Exelor* Generation 4300 VVinfield Road Warrenville, IL 60 1,55 RS-07-059 May 3, 2007 www exeloncorp com U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis

May 19, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-05-18] Byron and Braidwood - Correction Letter re: Steam Generator Amendments. ML071210555 2007-05-09 5 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 NPF-037 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 TAC MC8966 TAC MC8967 tac mc8968 tac mc8969 2007-05-09 2007-05-17 May 9, 2007 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road

* [2007-05-15] Braidwood Station EOC Annual Assessment Letter (Report 05000452-07-001; 05000457-07-001). ML070610241 2007-03-02 6 2007-03-02 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] IR 05000456-06-005, 05000457-06-005 and IR 05000456-06-013, 05000457/2006013; 10/01/2006 - 12/31/2006; Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2; Fire Protection. ML070450051 2007-02-13 53 2007-02-13 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] IR 05000456-07-008 & 05000457-07-008; Exelon Generation Company, LLC; 01/29/07 - 02/02/07; Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2; Inspection Procedure 95001 Supplemental Inspection. ML070660063 2007-03-07 15 2007-03-07 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] IR 05000456-07002(DRS); IR 05000457-07-002(DRS); 01/08/2007 - 01/26/2007; Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2; Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (10 CFR 50.59), and Permanent Plant Modifications. ML070540413 2007-02-23 25 2007-02-23 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] 03/20/2007 Revised Notice of Meeting with Exelon Generation Co., LLC to Discuss licensing issues and schedule of upcoming licensing activities with the Exelon fleet of nuclear power plants (Braidwood, Units 1 and 2, Byron, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Clinton.... ML070600391 2007-02-27 8 2007-02-27 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, and LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Site-specific Decommissioning Cost Estimates. ML070600197 2007-02-27 5 2007-02-27 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report. ML070400444 2007-02-09 1 2007-02-09 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Braidwood Units 1 & 2, Byron Units 1 & 2, Additional Information Supporting Application for Steam Generator Tube Integrity Technical Specification Improvement. ML070670126 2007-03-07 2 2007-03-07 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Braidwood, Units 1 and 2, Byron, Unit 2 and Three Mile Island, Unit 1, Supplemental Response Regarding Inspection and Mitigation of Alloy 600/82/182 Pressurizer Butt Welds. ML070520499 2007-02-21 10 2007-02-21 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Braidwood, Units 1 and 2, Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (PTLRs), Revision 4. ML070680370 2007-03-08 52 2007-03-08 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Braidwood, Units 1 and 2, Second 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval, Relief Request I2R-48, Structural Weld Overlays on Pressurizer Spray, Relief, Safety and Surge Nozzle Safe-Ends and Associated Alternative Repair Techniques. ML070540346 2007-02-23 28 2007-02-23 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Branch chief reassignment letter for Braidwood, Units 1 and 2; Byron, Unit 1 and 2; Clinton, Unit 1; Dresden, Units 2 and 3; LaSalle, Units 1 and 2; Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2; Davis-Besse, Unit 1 and Perry, Unit 1. ML070640584 2007-03-07 14 2007-03-07 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Byron, Units 1 and 2 and Braidwood, Units 1 and 2 - Westinghouse Electric Company, Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure. ML070610060 2007-03-14 5 2007-03-14 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Confirmatory Action Letter - Braidwood, Units 1 and 2. ML070740294 2007-03-22 8 2007-03-22 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] LaSalle, Units 1 and 2; Byron, Units 1 and 2; Braidwood, Units 1 and 2 - RAI Related to Site Specific Decommission Cost Estimates. ML070590685 2007-03-07 8 2007-03-07 2007-05-14

* [2007-05-15] Westinghouse LLC, Request for Withholding Information From Public Disclosure for Byron, Unit 2 and Braidwood, Unit 2 - re: SG-CDME-07-02P. ML070720300 2007-03-28 5 2007-03-28 2007-05-14

May 12, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-05-09] Braidwood, Units 1 and 2, Clinton, Unit 1 and Quad cities, Units 1 and 2, RAI, GL-06-003, "Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire barrier Configurations". ML071140323 2007-05-02 7 05000254 05000265 05000456 05000457 05000461 DPR-029 DPR-030 NPF-062 NPF-072 NPF-077 GL-06-003 TAC MD1550 TAC MD1551 TAC MD1564 TAC MD1621 TAC MD1622 2007-05-02 2007-05-08 May 2, 2007 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Gene

* [2007-05-08] Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Annual Dose Report for 2006. ML071170380 2007-04-27 1 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 BW070037 2007-04-27 2007-05-07 Exel n Exelon Generation Conipany, LLC wvw.exeloncorp corn Nuci ear Braidvood Station 39r~ L 9 10 CFR 2ft2206(c) April 27, 2007 BW070037 REIRS Project Manager Office of Nuclear Regulatory Res

May 5, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-05-02] Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, and Braidwood Station, Unit 1 and 2 - NRC Generic Letter 2006-01: Steam Generator Tube Integrity and Associated Technical Specifications (TAC No. MD0066, MD0067, MD0068 and MD0069). ML071000026 2007-04-24 3 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 TAC MD0066 TAC MD0067 TAC MD0068 TAC MD0069 2007-04-24 2007-05-01 April 24, 2007 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJEC

* [2007-05-02] Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education - Letter Report for 34 Water Samples from the Vicinity of Braidwood Station. ML071140222 2007-04-20 4 05000456 RFTA-06-001 IR-07-003 2007-04-20 2007-05-01 OAK RIDGE INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND EDUCATION Aprd 20,2007 hlr. WAam Snell U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regon I11 2443 Warrenvdle Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351 SUBJECT: LETTER REPORT FOR 34 WATER SAMPL

April 28, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-04-28] Braidwood, Units 2 and 2; Byron, Units 1 and 2 and LaSalle, Units 1 and 2 - Review of Site Specific Decommissioning Cost Estimates. ML071070368 2007-04-24 5 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 NPF-011 NPF-018 NPF-037 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 TAC MD3928 TAC MD3929 TAC MD3930 TAC MD3931 TAC MD3932 2007-04-24 2007-04-27 1 Once a licensee is no longer legally eligible to recover all decommissionin

* [2007-04-27] Braidwood EOC Meeting Notice Letter to Licensee. ML071140352 2007-04-20 4 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 2007-04-20 2007-04-26 April 20, 2007 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: PUBLIC MEETING TO REVIEW 200

* [2007-04-27] Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2; Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Dresden Units 2 and 3; LaSalle Units 1 and 2; Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3; Quad Cities Units 1 and 2: Request For Additional Information. ML070930349 2007-04-19 12 05000010 05000171 05000219 05000237 05000249 05000254 05000265 05000277 05000278 05000289 05000295 05000304 05000352 05000353 05000373 05000374 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 05000461 TAC MD4400 TAC MD4401 TAC MD4402 TAC MD4403 TAC MD4404 TAC MD4405 T

* [2007-04-25] 05/22/2007 Notice of Meeting With Licensee to Discuss NRC End-of-Cycle Assessment of Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 Performance for the 2007 Calendar Year. ML071140376 2007-04-20 3 05000456 05000457 2007-04-20 2007-04-24 April 20, 2007 NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT MEETING THIS MEETING IS OPEN TO PUBLIC ATTENDANCE Name of Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Name of Facility: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos: 50-456; 50-457 Da

* [2007-04-25] Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education - Letter Report for 18 Water Samples from the Vicinity of the Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, Braidwood, Illinois [Inspection Report No. 050-00456/2007-003] (RFTA No. 06-001). ML070730027 2007-03-07 5 05000456 IR-07-003 RFTA 06-001 IR-07-003 2007-03-07 2007-04-24 OAK RIDQE INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND EDUCATION hlarch 7, 2007 llr. Wiham Snell L S. Nuclear Regulatory Commssion Regon I11 3133 W'arrenvdle Road 1 .tslc. IL 60532-135 1 SUBJECT: LETTER REPORT FO

* [2007-04-24] Braidwood, Units 1 & 2, Byron, Units 1 & 2, Annual Report of the Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors Required by 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors." ML071030399 2007-04-13 14 05000454 05000455 05000456 05000457 NPF-037 NPF-066 NPF-072 NPF-077 RS-07-052 2007-04-13 2007-04-23 Exelor Generation wvvw.exeloncorp_com 4300 Vd ;nfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 RS-07-052 April 13, 2007 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

April 21, 2007

New this week from NRC Public Document Room

* [2007-04-21] Braidwood Administrative Change to License in Conjunction with Order EA-06-037. ML071020372 2007-02-01 5 05000456 05000457 NPF-072 NPF-077 EA-06-037 TAC MD2196 TAC MD2197 2007-02-01 2007-04-20 .fil UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 1, 2007 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer AmerGen Energ

March 3, 2007

Braidwood mod had sulfuric acid tanks sharing common drain with sodium hypochlorite tank, despite the fact that mixing these two chemicals produces chlorine gas

We've previously described NRC's power reactor enforcement policy as a sort of "no harm, no foul" kind of thing. This came to mind, and not in a warm and fuzzy way, when reading the latest Braidwood inspection report. If anyone out there agrees with NRC that this non-cited violation has low safety significance, I hope you'll volunteer to write up an explanation as to why. I'll publish it on the top of the front page here at nuclear.com, just as this excerpt from the inspection report is:

... Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

Green. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59 "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," having very low safety significance (Green) for the licenseeÕs failure to perform an adequate safety evaluation review for changes made to the facility per modification EC 357102. In safety evaluation BWR-E-2006-196 (for EC 357102), the licensee failed to provide an adequate basis as to why the installation of two 15,000 gallon sulfuric acid tanks sharing a common drain system with a sodium hypochlorite tank did not create conditions for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. When these chemicals mix, they would produce an on-site release of chlorine gas, which could potentially overcome the control room operators. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and considered the control room heating, ventilation and air conditioning system operable because of the time of year (mid-winter) such that weather conditions favoring formation of a tornado does not occur. Also, the licensee stated that the sulfuric acid tanks would be drained to approximately 2000 gallons each during the times of year when tornadoes are more likely to minimize the magnitude of any chlorine release.

Because the issue potentially impacted the NRCÕs ability to perform its regulatory function, this finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the activity to install the new sulfuric acid tanks without detection and alarm circuits to notify the control room would not have ultimately required NRC prior approval. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because the licensee did not make appropriate or conservative decisions with respect to reviewing the plant design and license basis. Specifically, the licensee staff chose a narrow interpretation of Regulatory Guide 1.78 "Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release," such that a control room habitability evaluation for an on-site chlorine gas release was not completed. The finding was not suitable for a significance determination process evaluation, but has been reviewed by NRC Management in accordance with qualitative criteria of Appendix M of IMC 0609 and is determined to be a finding of very low safety significance. (Section 1R02.1.b.1)

... REPORT DETAILS
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (71111.02)
.1 Review of 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations and Screenings ...
b. Findings
b.1 Inadequate Basis in 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Installation of Sulfuric Acid System

Introduction: The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.59 "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," having very low safety significance (Green) for the licenseeÕs failure to perform an adequate safety evaluation review for changes made to the facility per modification EC 357102. In safety evaluation BWR-E-2006-196 (for EC 357102), the licensee failed to provide an adequate basis as to why the installation of two 15,000 gallon sulfuric acid tanks sharing a common drain system with a sodium hypochlorite tank did not create conditions for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). When these chemicals mix, they would produce an on-site release of chlorine gas, which could potentially overcome the control room operators. This accident scenario had not been previously considered in the UFSAR and was not bounded by the evaluation of chlorine gas released from off-site sources.

Description: The Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 were originally equipped with chlorine gas detectors, which served to automatically isolate the control room heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system from the outside air if chlorine gas was detected. The licensee had changed the plant Technical Specifications (TS) and UFSAR to remove the automatic chlorine gas detection system and associated TS surveillances based upon the capability to manually realign the control room HVAC and isolate the control room envelope from a potential off-site spill of chlorine gas (no on-site source of chlorine gas existed). In the NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) dated February 28, 1995, the NRC approved removal of the chlorine detection systems and associated TS surveillances for the control room HVAC system. In this SE, the NRC considered off-site transportation-related chlorine gas release sources and the basis for approval included "no potential for stationary chlorine release that could pose a threat to control room habitability." Mitigation of chlorine gas from off-site sources was discussed in Section 6.4.4.2 of the UFSAR and was dependent upon timely notification of chlorine gas spills from off-site authorities. This section stated: "The control room HVAC system is provided with control switches on the local control panels which can manually isolate the system upon notification of an accidental release of chlorine gas from sources external to the station."

The control of on-site storage facilities containing hazardous chemicals for the Braidwood Station is identified in Appendix A of the UFSAR which implemented Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.78 "Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release," Revision 0. This RG identified a detailed list and quantity of chemicals considered hazardous to control room habitability, which included both sulfuric acid and chlorine gas. This RG required a detailed analysis of the effects of a hazardous substances released (such as chlorine gas) on the habitability of the control room.

In December of 2006, the licensee installed a bulk sulfuric acid addition system at the lake screenhouse under EC 357102. This included installation of two 15,000 gallon capacity tanks of sulfuric acid in proximity to a sodium hypochlorite storage tank and the tanks share a common drainage system. These tanks were located at the lake screen house which the inspectors estimated was within approximately 0.5 miles of the control room air intake. In safety evaluation BWR-E-2006-196 "Sulfuric Acid System Addition at the Lake Screenhouse," the licensee recognized that a chlorine gas release would occur following a failure of these tanks due to tornado or tornado driven missiles. Specifically, these tanks were not designed to withstand the wind loads or postulated missiles described in Table 3.5-3 "Tornado Generated Missiles and Their Properties" of the UFSAR. In a tornado induced tank failure, the contents of the sulfuric acid and sodium hypochlorite tanks would mix in the common drainage piping system surrounding these tanks and generate chlorine gas. In BWR-E-2006-196, the licensee determined that release of chlorine gas was a low probability event, but did not evaluate how this event would be mitigated, nor how the storage system deviated from the design and licensing basis described in the NRC SE or UFSAR Sections discussed above. Specifically, Appendix B of RG 1.78 required a detailed diffusion analysis for release of a hazardous chemicals (e.g., chlorine) to assess the impact on control room habitability. Further, step C.3 of RG 1.78 stated any hazardous chemicals stored on-site should be accompanied by instrumentation that will detect its escape, set off an alarm, and provide a readout in the control room. The licensee staff stated that they met RG 1.78, because the vapor pressure of sulfuric acid was below 10 torr as discussed in step C.5 of RG 1.78 and therefore, no evaluation of the toxic effects from a sulfuric acid spill on control room habitability was required. Also, with no direct storage of chlorine gas on-site, the licensee did not believe RG 1.78 controls applied to the release of chlorine gas generated by the mixing of sulfuric acid and sodium hypochlorite. The inspectors did not believe this narrow interpretation of RG 1.78 was appropriate, because Step C.12 of RG 1.78 required that concurrent chemical release of container contents during an earthquake, tornado or flood should be considered for chemical container facilities that are not designed to withstand these natural events.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee had not provided an adequate basis to answer Question 5 of safety evaluation BWR-E-2006-196 which asked "Does the proposed activity create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR?" The licensee incorrectly answered "no" to this question based upon a determination that the on-site release of chlorine gas was unlikely and that the control room response to an on-site release would be the same as that discussed in the UFSAR for an off-site chlorine gas release. These statements are true, but the licensee failed to identify, and evaluate the lack of any notification systems such as the automatic detection and alarm systems that read out in the control room as described in RG 1.78 for storage of on-site chemicals which pose a hazard to control room habitability. Without automatic alarm systems, the inspectors concluded, that in the event of an on-site generation of chlorine gas, the control room operators may not have sufficient notification to preclude chlorine intrusion into the control room. Because the licensee had not completed a detailed diffusion analysis for the potential chlorine gas generated as discussed in Appendix B of RG 1.78, the inspectors could not determine the consequences of this postulated event. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the storage of bulk sulfuric acid in proximity to the sodium hypochlorite tank created conditions for a different type of accident than any previously considered in the UFSAR.

The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (AR 00583639) and considered the control room HVAC system operable because of the time of year (mid-winter) such that weather conditions favoring formation of a tornado does not occur. Also, the licensee stated that the sulfuric acid tanks would be drained to approximately 2000 gallons each during the times of year when tornadoes are more likely to minimize the magnitude of any chlorine release.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that this issue was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation, because in December of 2006, the licensee failed to provide an adequate basis for changes made to the facility in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide an adequate basis as to why changes made per modification EC 357102 did not create conditions for a different type of accident than any previously considered in the UFSAR. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the activity to install the new sulfuric acid tanks without detection and alarm circuits to notify the control room would not have ultimately required NRC prior approval. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because the licensee did not make appropriate or conservative decisions with respect to reviewing the plant design and license basis. Specifically, the licensee staff chose a narrow interpretation of RG 1.78, such that a control room habitability evaluation for an on-site chlorine gas release was not completed. Further, the licensee staff had not reviewed the basis for the NRC SE related to control room habitability from an off-site chlorine gas release to determine if it would bound an on-site release of chlorine gas. Because violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process, they are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the significance determination process (SDP). However, if possible, the underlying technical issue is evaluated under the SDP to determine the severity of the violation. In this case, the underlying technical issue affected the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. The finding was evaluated under the SDP using NRCÕs inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," and the inspectors answered "yes" to the question "Does the finding represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere"? The SDP required a phase 3 analysis to resolve this type of finding. However, after consultation with a Region 3 Senior Reactor Analyst it became apparent that no SDP methods or tools exist to determine the significance of the finding. Therefore, the finding was not suitable for evaluation using the SDP, so the risk significance was established in accordance with the qualitative criteria of Appendix M of IMC 0609. Specifically, the qualitative decision-making attribute from Table 4.1 of Appendix M "Period of time (exposure) effect on the performance deficiency" was applicable to this finding. Because this modification had only been installed since December of 2006, the exposure time for this accident scenario was low. Further, the probability of tornado or tornado generated missiles hitting and rupturing both the sulfuric acid tank and the sodium hypochlorite tank concurrently causing the contents of the tanks to mix in the common drainage to produce chlorine gas was also very low. Therefore, based upon a qualitative measure of risk determined in accordance with Appendix M, NRC Management concluded that the issue was of very low safety significance (Green).

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) states, in part, that the licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility, of changes in procedures, and of tests and experiments as described in the UFSAR. These records must include a written evaluation which provides a basis for the determination that the change, test, or experiment does not require a license amendment.

Contrary to the above, as of January 26, 2007, the licensee failed to provide an adequate basis for the determination that the change to the facility per EC 357102 in December of 2006, was acceptable without a licensee amendment. Specifically, in BWR-E-2006-196, the licensee failed to provide an adequate basis as to why the installation of two 15,000 gallon sulfuric acid tanks in proximity to a sodium hypochlorite tank did not create conditions for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR. In this case, the accident scenario involving an on-site release of chlorine gas overcoming the control room operators had not been previously evaluated in the UFSAR and was not bounded by the UFSAR evaluation of chlorine releases from off-site sources. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, this violation of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 was classified as a Severity Level IV Violation because the underlying technical issue was of very low safety significance. Because this non-willful violation was non-repetitive, and was captured in the licenseeÕs corrective action program (AR 00583639), it is considered a NCV consistent with VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000456/2007002-01; 05000457/2007002-01 (DRS))

[The inspection report is available here.

November 27, 2006

Strangers at Braidwood gates

Twice last month, motorists were charged with drunken driving after pulling up to the security guardhouse -- by mistake -- at the nuclear-power plant in Braidwood, Ill. Lloyd Kuykendall, 38, handed a guard $1, thinking he had approached a tollbooth, according to police; and 10 days later, Stanislaw Drobrzawski, 51, tried to align his car with the guardhouse, seeing it as a gas-station pump.

[Source: Chuck Shepherd (Universal Press Syndicate), "NEWS OF THE WEIRD", The Columbus Dispatch, November 27, 2006, p. D8]

September 11, 2006

* Braidwood and Byron head (RPV) inspection - alternative method approved

* [2006-03-20] Documents show Exelon took steps to keep leak hidden
Sauk Valley Newspapers

* [2006-03-16] Ill. Nuclear Power Plant Operator Sued
Nathaniel Hernandez, Guardian

* [2006-03-16] Illinois files suit against Exelon for nuke spills
Andrew Stern, Reuters

* [2006-03-14] Exelon sued over Illinois nuclear plant's spills
Reuters

February 16, 2006

* Tritium contamination found at Dresden and Byron too (that makes three, counting Braidwood)

July 27, 2005

Worker use of Condition Report system seen as indicating safety conscious work environment

NRC inspectors determined that Braidwood employees were writing Condition Reports (CRs) with a low threshold, that employees at all levels of the organization were writing CRs, and that CRs were written for all issues of significance. The largest group of CRs concerned industrial safety issues, however, the inspectors also noted a large number of CRs for employee identified equipment issues. "Collectively," the report concluded, "this provided one indication of a safety conscious work environment."

[Source: S. Ray (NRC Senior Resident Inspector) et al., Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-456/2005-3, July 18, 2005, ML052000067]

June 30, 2005

Summary of Plant Status - April 1 through June 30, 2005

Unit 1 operated at or near full power for the entire period.

Unit 2 started the period in a forced outage due to a generator bushing failure that occurred on March 31, 2005. On April 2, 2005, Unit 2 was returned to full power. Unit 2 continued to operate at full power until April 17, 2005, when it was shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage (A2R11). On May 7, 2005, Unit 2 was returned to full power. Unit 2 continued to operate at or near full power for the remainder of the period.

[Source: S. Ray (NRC Senior Resident Inspector) et al., Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-456/2005-3, July 18, 2005, ML052000067]

January 7, 2005

Exelon announcement of management personnel changes:

* Mike Pacillio to be promoted to Senior Vice President for Midwest Operations responsible for Braidwood, Byron, Clinton, Dresden, LaSalle, Quad Cities and Zion stations

* Tom Joyce (formerly Site VP for Braidwood) is Site VP for Salem

* Keith Polsen is Braidwood Site VP (formerly Braidwood Plant Manager)

* Greg Boerschig is Braidwood Plant Manager (formerly Quad Cities Engineering Director)

December 4, 2003

Operating Experience Related to Power Uprates:
Abnormalities in Ultrasonic Flow Meter Instrumentation Readings

On August 28, 2003, Exelon informed the staff that it was reducing the operating power of Byron Units 1 and 2 by 32 MWe and 22 MWe, respectively. The decision was made following analysis of feedwater flow data derived from the Advanced Measurement and Analysis Group (AMAG) ultrasonic flow meters (UFMs) in use at Byron and Braidwood. Exelon reported that there were signal abnormalities from some of the UFMs, and on Byron 1, there were statistical differences between the total feedwater flow and the sum of the flows from the four individual feedwater lines. On September 1, 2003, the power at Braidwood Unit 2 was reduced for similar reasons. Westinghouse issued Technical Bulletin (TB) 03-6 on September 5, 2003, to inform its customers of the abnormalities experienced at the Byron and Braidwood plants. TB 03-6 also provides recommendations for plants to monitor their instrumentation to identify promptly any such abnormalities at their plants. The staff met with Westinghouse on September 26, 2003, to discuss efforts Westinghouse has taken to identify the cause of these abnormalities.

Westinghouse has not completed its root-cause evaluation of the problems, but currently believes that plant equipment near the instruments could have caused contamination in the signal, thus leading to incorrect readings by the flow meter. Westinghouse has also preliminarily concluded that this issue is limited to Byron and Braidwood. Based on current information, the staff does not believe that this issue poses an immediate safety concern. The staff is closely following this issue for Byron and Braidwood, as well as any implications on instrument installations for MUR power uprates.

[Source: "Monthly Status Report On The Licensing Activities And Regulatory Duties Of The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 2003", enclosure to Nils J. Diaz (Chairman, NRC), letter to Sen. George V. Voinovich (Chairman, Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change and Nuclear Safety, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works), November 25, 2003, ACN ML032900350]

Recent NRC inspections

* (released Nov 20) Braidwood problem ID and resolution report 50-456-2003-9

* (released August 30) Braidwood fire protection report 50-456-2003-5

* Braidwood safeguards report 50-456-2003-4

* Braidwood report 50-466-2003-2

* Braidwood report 50-456/2002-9

September 1, 2003

Braidwood - lack of exercise hardened grease in (most) circuit breakers

Braidwood has a lot of circuit breakers, including about 3,000 of a "molded case" design known as Westinghouse adjustable magnetic HFB style, many of which are used on safety-related systems. The plant established a formalized testing program for these breakers some years ago, and identified that many of the breakers were failing the tests. In fact, of the 90 tested between June 2002 and June 2003, more than half failed. The problem appears to be that the grease inside the circuit breakers hardens over time. Westinghouse recommends cycling the breaker every month to move the grease around. This helps extend the operational life of the breaker. If left undisturbed, the grease will become quite like cement after as few as six or so years. Most of Braidwood's MCCBs were manufactured in 1970s-1980s. A recent NRC fire protection team evaluated the problem, and the plant's follow-up. The inspectors concluded that the plant should have had the grease problem under control long ago. NRC put out an information notice ten years ago describing the importance of exercising these breakers. The violation was categorized by NRC as a Non-Cited Violation. For more on this story, click here.

Source: Z. Falevits (Senior Reactor Inspector, NRC Region III), et al., Braidwood inspection report 50-456-2003-5, August 21, 2003