Browns Ferry violation - 2 valves were not recognized as safety-related

Violation 05000259, 260, 296/2011011-04: Inaccurate Information Provided Regarding Scoping of Motor Operated Valves in the Generic Letter 89-10 Program

...[B]y letter dated January 6, 1997, TVA provided its response to a prior NRC request for reevaluation of the safety functions of certain Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) to be included in the BFN Unit 2 and 3 Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance" testing program. TVA's letter of January 6, 1997, addressed whether valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 had a redundant safety function to close to allow operation of the suppression pool cooling mode of the RHR System, and stated that "Closure of valves FCV- 74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. Therefore, these valves have no 'redundant' safety function and will not be included in the GL-89-10 program." The NRC concluded that this information was inaccurate because valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 do have a safety function to close to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode, as described in Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI) Appendix-17A, RHR SYSTEM OPERATION SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.

Additionally, TVA's letter of May 5, 2004 provided its updated response to NRC GL 89-10 for BFN Unit 1. TVA's updated response referenced 18 valves, including valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66, "that are not in the GL 89-10 program, since the valves are normally in their safety position." TVA's May 5, 2004 letter also referenced its previous January 6, 1997 letter regarding similar valves on Units 2 and 3 (including FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66) that were not in the GL 89-10 program, since the valves are normally in their safety position. The NRC concluded that the information provided in TVA's May 5, 2004 letter was incomplete in that it did not discuss or acknowledge that Unit 1 valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 in fact have a redundant safety function to close to allow operation of the suppression pool cooling mode of the RHR System, as described in EOI Appendix-17A.

No actual consequences occurred as a result of the inaccurate information, because the subject valves, although inoperable for a period of time, were not required to function in response to an actual plant emergency. However, the inaccurate information had a significant impact on the NRC's regulatory process. In this case, the information was material to the NRC because it was used, in part, as the basis for determining that valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 for Units 1, 2, and 3 did not meet the conditions necessary to require incorporation into BFN's GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program. The NRC subsequently concluded that had these valves been included in the licensee's GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program, identification of the previously failed Unit 1 valve FCV-74-66 may have occurred earlier through the comprehensive testing that would have been implemented under the program. Therefore, this violation has been categorized in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy at Severity Level III.

Because [Browns Ferry] has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC identified the inaccurate information as a part of our follow-up inspection of the LPCI valve failure. As such, credit is not warranted for the factor of Identification.

Regarding corrective actions, TVA implemented a number of activities as discussed in its letter of December 19, 2011, including: (1) the submittal of written notification to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.9(b), by letters dated October 20, 2011, and December 19, 2011, acknowledging the inaccuracy in its January 6, 1997 letter and its May 5, 2004 letter; (2) procedural enhancements to TVA Procedure BP-213, "Managing TVA's Interface with NRC," and (3) reinforcement of procedural use and adherence with respect to the failure of BFN Unit 1 restart licensing personnel; (4) inclusion of subject LPCI valves within its GL 89-10 program and the development or revision of an existing procedure to provide the criteria for determining GL 89- 10 program scope, including active/passive classification.

The NRC notes that TVA's written response of December 19, 2011, did not provide any information regarding an extent of condition review for other GL 89-10 submittals, other BFN Unit 1 restart submittals, or any other TVA submittals to the NRC. An extent of condition review is important and necessary to the NRC as it would provide the NRC with sufficient confidence that the regulatory process and our regulatory oversight responsibilities were not substantively impeded in other areas of TVA/NRC interaction. Therefore, the NRC has concluded, based on the absence of an extent of condition review detailed in TVA's December 19, 2011 letter, that credit for corrective action is not warranted.

Normally, the NRC would propose that a civil penalty in the amount of two times the base, for a total of $130,000 based on the Enforcement Policy in effect at the time be assessed because credit is not warranted for the factors of Identification and Corrective Action. However, the NRC notes that the provisions of Title 28 to United States Code, Section 2462, "Time for commencing proceedings," are applicable to the circumstances of this enforcement matter. Section 2462 to Title 28 states that except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon. In this case, the violation of 10 CFR 50.9 occurred in 2004 for BFN Unit 1, and 1997 for BFN Units 2 and 3, which is a period of time greater than five years from the date of the enclosed Notice. Therefore, in consideration of the above, and in consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, a civil penalty will not be assessed in this case.

... For administrative purposes, Apparent Violation 05000259, 260, 296/2011011-04 is redesignated as Violation 05000259, 260, 296/2011011-04, Inaccurate Information Provided Regarding Scoping of Motor Operated Valves in the Generic Letter 89-10 Program is opened.

Source: Victor M. McCree (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II), letter to TVA, "BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000259/2012010, 05000260/2012010, AND 05000296/2012010", EA-11-018, EA-11-252 January 23, 2012.

The letter, and notice of violation were released on January 25, 2012 as ML12024A499

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